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We present FPDetect, a low overhead approach for detecting logical errors and soft errors affecting stencil computations
without generating false positives. We develop an offline analysis that tightly estimates the number of floating-point bits
preserved across stencil applications. This estimate rigorously bounds the values expected in the data space of the computation.
Violations of this bound can be attributed with certainty to errors. FPDetect helps synthesize error detectors customized for
user-specified levels of accuracy and coverage. FPDetect also enables overhead reduction techniques based on deploying
these detectors coarsely in space and time. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the practicality of our approach.
1 INTRODUCTION
Approaching the end of Moore’s law, chip manufacturers are seeking smaller lithographies, higher densities
often achieved by emerging 3D stacking methods, newer memory/interconnect technologies, and increasing
use of GPUs and other accelerators. These trends are increasing the likelihood of soft errors [4, 9, 37, 40, 42]
already noticed to be high in GPU-based systems [49]. The increased pressure toward specialization [26] may
reduce the economies of scale achieved through general purpose parts, and put cost-reduction pressures on
verification methods, which already are stressed [29]. This can increase residual logical bugs in chips. The
increasing complexity of compiler optimizations will also increase the likelihood of introducing logical bugs [3].
Software-level error detectors can serve as uniform and application-aware ways of trapping both soft errors [38]
and logical bugs [3], and these detectors are needed more than ever before.
Unfortunately, system resilience research has, so far, gone nowhere in terms of adoptions into practice. The
main underlying reason is that in today’s systems, these resilience solutions geared toward soft errors will largely
cause a slowdown, with no apparent benefits from the point of view of soft errors. It may even aggravate the
problem due to the high false positive rates in today’s resilience solutions. Last but not least, today’s resilience
solutions have not been demonstrated to have the ability to reliably flag logical errors.
Our main contribution in this paper is to demonstrate that for a narrow class of applications—specifically
stencil-based—we can indeed develop solutions that benefit both logical error protection and soft error protection,
owing to our solutions having two key attributes: (1) no false positives, and (2) acceptable overheads. With
this combination, we strongly believe that resilience solutions will be welcomed more readily, at least for their
immediate impact on logical bugs.
Stencils belong to an important class of iterative solvers operating on dense D-dimensional arrays modeling
partial differential equations (PDEs) with applications belonging to fluid dynamics, cosmology, combustion, etc.1
They are part of the essential building blocks for solving larger more composite problems involving multiple
PDEs.
1While our approach applies to sparse stencils, we focus on stencils operating on dense matrices.
2020. XXXX-XXXX/2020/5-ART1 $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: May 2020.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
04
35
9v
3 
 [c
s.D
C]
  8
 M
ay
 20
20
1:2 • Das and Krishnamoorthy, et al.
The ability to write good assertions that capture a stencil computation’s evolving profile of data is tricky and
error-prone. Existing work on system resilience that address data integrity include time-series data analysis
methods [17] and data outlier detection methods constructed using machine learning (e.g. [44, 46]). Unfortunately,
these approaches have high overheads, and can only help loosely characterize the expected data value ranges.
They additionally bring in training bias into the models constructed. Given that they both overestimate and
underestimate the data ranges, detectors based on them generate both false positives and false negatives. With
soft error detection, false positives are virtually unacceptable, given that the natural soft error rates themselves
are quite low (false positive needlessly engage checkpoint/recovery systems).
FPDetect is the first approach that takes the novel approach of basing data-space protection on accurate floating-
point round-off error estimation. Like any calculation carried out by numerical code, stencil-based calculations are
also subject to floating-point rounding error. However, given that stencils are more structured, we show that
one can develop a rigorous floating-point round-off error estimation approach for them, guaranteeing a certain
number of mantissa bits after every stencil application. Consequently, in the FPDetect approach, if “round-off”
appears suddenly exaggerated, we can attribute it reliably—without any false positives—to a logical bug or a soft
error.
Contemporary floating-point error estimation approaches using interval analysis [6, 32] tend to give excessively
conservative estimates(due to loss of correlation) of round-off error—especially for large programs that are iterated
over time. These conservative estimates with large error bounds implies guarantees for only the higher order
mantissa bits, i.e., only those errors that cause very high magnitude changes can be trapped using them.2
FPTaylor [12] builds symbolic taylor forms for the error expressions resulting in tight guarantees but do not scale
to be usable beyond a few hundred operators. FPDetect on the other hand provide tighter guarantees on the
error for large stencil programs, thus helping protect more mantissa bits, and also allows a tunable approach to
trading off overhead against detection precision, as we show in this paper.
Classical approaches like dual modular redundancy (DMR) can rigorously detect silent data corruptions by
utilizing a duplicated execution thread and checking for result matches. This unfortunately can double the overall
computation time. Clover [33] exercises a selective instruction duplication strategy to bring down the SDC
detection cost to around 26% using tail-DMR. However, this approach is meant only for soft errors; it cannot be
used to trap compiler bugs because they impact both the execution threads.
In this paper, we show that by focusing on a narrow (but important) class of applications—in our case stencils—
we can arrive at a unified solution for detecting compiler bugs and soft errors while also offering rigorous
guarantees. We offer our tool FPDetect, a software based error detector, whose core approach is based on rigorous
floating-point round-off error analysis for an iterated application of the stencil across T computational steps. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that encompasses two important correctness checks around the
single central idea of offline round-off analysis.
Roadmap: §2 provides an overview of FPDetect including error analysis, and optimizations. §3 is an overview of
how FPDetect helps detect software bugs and soft errors. To reduce overheads, we establish a crucial result that
if we leapfrog stencil applications and the detectorsT steps ahead do not detect a soft error, then we can establish
a certified baseline that allows earlier time steps to be forgotten based on the fact that uncaught soft errors in
earlier steps will not affect future detection. This allows FPDetect detectors to be deployed sparsely in space
and time (e.g., once per 64 time steps) (§4 and §5). We perform offline detector synthesis to create lookup tables,
and instantiate specific detectors just before execution (§6). Our evaluation (§7) includes results on software bug
detection and resilience (both simulated through fault injection). Additional related work (§8) and conclusions
(§9) follow.
2That is, should these methods be used to synthesize error detectors, which hasn’t been done.
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2 OVERVIEW
Background on Floating-point error analysis: Floating-point error analysis is a vast area, and we provide
only a brief overview (see [24, 36] for details). A floating point number system, F, in radix, β , is a subset of the
set of real numbers, and can be expressed as a 5 tuple (β, s,m, e,p). We use binary (β = 2) double precision with
number of precision bits, p = 53. s ∈ {−1, 1} is the sign bit, e is the exponent in the range −1022 ≤ e ≤ 1023, and
m is the mantissa or the significand, and represents the magnitude s ·m · 2e . If x ∈ R, then xf ∈ F denotes an
element in F closest to x obtained by applying the rounding operator (◦) to x . We use the bound consistent for all
IEE754 [1] rounding modes.
In floating point arithmetic, the absolute error is the magnitude difference between the values yielded by
computations done in the space of real numbers (“true answer”) and those done in floating point. The relative
error is the ratio of the absolute error and the true answer. Every real number x lying in the range of F can be
approximated by an element xf ∈ Fwith a relative error no larger than the unit round-offu = 0.5×β1−p . Here β1−p
corresponds to the unit of least precision(ulp) for exponent value of 1. We use µ to denote ulp(1), such that µ = 2u.
In our case u = 2−53, and hence µ = 2−52. Hence, for all rounding modes(◦), ◦(x) = x(1 + δ ), |δ | ≤ u = µ/2.
Given two exactly represented floating point numbers xf and yf , arithmetic operators ⋄ ∈ {+,−,×} have the
following guarantees across any rounding modes:
xf ⋄f yf = (xf ⋄yf )(1 + δ ) = (xf ⋄yf ) + (xf ⋄yf )δ , |δ | ≤ 2u = µ (1)
In our work, we employ affine arithmetic [16] for error estimation. In an affine representation, each input
variable xˆ is represented by xˆ = x0 +
∑n
i=1 xiϵi , with x0 denoting the central value of the corresponding interval,
and coefficients xi being finite floating point numbers. The ϵi are formal noise variables which are unknown until
concretized but assumed to lie in the interval [-1,+1]. The xi model the noise coefficients such that the round-off
error in equation (1) can be expressed as xi = (xf ⋄yf ) × 2, with a noise variable ϵi ∈ [−1, 1].
We define two operators, σ and γ that allows us to retrieve the associated noise variable and coefficient
information for each affine variable.
• σ : Defines the mapping from an affine variable to its set of noise variables. Thus σ (xˆ) = {ϵi }ni=1.• γ :Defines the mapping from a 2-tuple of (affine variable, noise variable) to its corresponding noise coefficient.
Thus γ (xˆ , ϵi ) return xi if ϵi ∈ σ (xˆ) else return 0.
Using these operators, at every operator site, a fresh noise variable is introduced and their collective impact in
the forward path is tracked using affine analysis. For codes implemented with the round to nearest model (as in
most cases), one can configure u = µ, to obtain stricter bounds.3.
Illustrative example:We now illustrate the concepts and practical details behind FPDetect using the simplified
1D stencil of 3 inputs leapfrogged (iterated) over 6 time steps (Figure 1). In this example, the stencil coefficients
are 0.25, 0.5, 0.25 (say, modeling discretized heat flow) working on problem array A. The value A[x , t + 1] can be
calculated to be 0.25 ∗A[x − 1, t]+ 0.5 ∗A[x , t]+ 0.25 ∗A[x + 1, t]. We call this approach of obtaining the values at
the next time step the iterated evaluation scheme. One can also imagine obtaining the value at A[x , t + 6] through
direct evaluation that leapfrogs 6 steps, provided one calculates the effective path coefficients. Table 1 illustrates
how these coefficients may be calculated by taking the sum of the product of the path weights (Set2, for instance,
is 0.375 = 0.25 ∗ 0.25 + 0.25 ∗ 0.25 + 0.5 ∗ 0.5).
Now, given a specific unroll (leapfrog distance) of T , we can then generate a similar table for that unroll,
obtaining, for a k point stencil, (k − 1)T + 1 effective coefficients. For example for a 3-point stencil over T = 5
steps, we obtain 11 separate coefficients for contribution from each of the corresponding unrolled points. Then,
given (k − 1)T + 1 runtime values of these points, the direct evaluation scheme can obtain the valueT steps ahead,
3A full derivation of error bound using affine arithmetic are presented in the separate supplementary material for the interested
reader in Appendix A
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Table 1. Evolution of Coefficient values as we unroll the stencil
Set Number Coefficients at Offsets
offset index→ -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Set1 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0
Set2 0 0.0625 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.0625 0
Set3 0.015625 0.09375 0.234375 0.3125 0.234375 0.09375 0.015625
and is the basis of realizing FPDetect detectors. We in fact implement this dot product of input values with the
effective coefficients being in higher precision, and also employ Kahan’s [30] summation algorithm, as well as
vectorization, thus minimizing the relative error of this answer.4 Thus we obtain an estimate for the relative error
with minimal precision loss; call it Rd for relative error under direct evaluation.
While we know Rd , we cannot give any bounds on the number of mantissa bits preserved unless we also know
the iterated evaluation’s relative error, say Rs (s for “serial” evaluation). A key contribution we make is to tightly
estimate Rs analytically.
Fig. 1. Simplified 1D stencil over 6 time
steps Fig. 2. Illustration of path dominance Fig. 3. Essential (Ew ) and protected
widths (Pw )
Iterated Evaluation: That there are many reconvergent computational paths to be taken into account during
iterated evaluation for generating the output at [x , t + 6] from the inputs at t . In such situations, unless we
keep the errors on various re-convergent paths correlated, we will obtain uselessly exaggerated error bounds.
Fortunately, affine arithmetic is well known for being able to handle error analysis in such situations. As an
example, (x − x) yields 0 under affine arithmetic (whereas interval arithmetic will yield an interval with the error
in x doubled [36]).
Fig. 4. Computational graph with highlighted deriva-
tives for 1 step of a 1-d 3-point stencil
Fig. 5. Error propagation from point (x-1,t0+t’) to
(x,t0+T) (1-d stencil)
4We also employ vectorization to reduce overheads in the FPDetect detector.
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Fig. 6. Overview of FPDetect
FPDetect comprises of an offline phase which includes static error analysis of the stencil combined with
conservative profiling of the stencil (detailed in 6) for a set of protection goals as shown in Figure 6. Our error
analysis method uses affine arithmetic building upon the works of [6, 13, 27] but are applied to much larger
expressions. As a simple ilustration, consider a single step iteration of a 1-d 3-point stencil with stencil coefficients
{c1, c2, c3} centered around x2 to evaluate x2 for the next time step, denoted here as S in Figure 4. Thus the
computational graph evaluates S = ((c1 × x1) + (c2 × x2)) + (c3 × x3). If ϵ ′ is a noise variable belonging to σ (x1),
then the error contribution’s propagation at S will be
γ (x1, ϵ ′) · Kx1 = γ (x1, ϵ ′) ·
 dSdx1
 = γ (x1, ϵ ′) · dSdS · dSdq · dqdz1 · dz1dx1
 = γ (x1, ϵ ′) · 1 · 1 · 1 · c1
= γ (x1, ϵ ′) · c1
(2)
Thus for all such ϵ ′ ∈ σ (x1), the γ (x1, ϵ ′) gets propagated by c1 (and similarly for x2, x3, z1, z2, z3 and q). Effectively,
every incoming node or an internal compute node has a locally generated error term, and a propagation factor
that propagates this error to the output node.
We can iteratively evaluate the stencil and arrive at this output value by (conceptually) picking all intermediate
points, such as P that is highlighted in Figure 5, and first finding the error flowing into P . Then find out how this
error is modified by all the path coefficients from P to the output. Do this for each point in the iteration space that
iteratively contribute to the output at the detector location. Accumulating these error terms and normalizing them
gives us the relative error Rs under iterated evaluation. While iterated evaluation mimics the stencil evaluation
itself, we are conservatively estimating this error during the offline phase of FPDetect. Our error analysis suitably
combines the error for all such conceptual points P using affine arithmetic.
Detector precision (dpT ):We now can define a precision threshold to be checked for correctness at the detector
locations.5 Called detector precisiondpT (where the subscriptT indicates it is a function of the number of lookahead
Tsteps) it is defined as bits preservedT = (dp)T = p − log2(max(Rs ,Rd )) which says “remove the maximum of the
uncertainties between the direct and iterated evaluations.” Given that we minimize Rd , the key factor impacting
the number of bits preserved will be the main stencil’s iterated evaluations. Soft errors or logical bugs that throw
the actual error beyond the dpT limit can then be trapped with the guarantee of no false positives. Furthermore,
all events whose impact falls within the guaranteed precision will be trapped. The only case of omission (which
is outside of our model) is when two faults simultaneously land within the scope of two adjacent detectors, and
both these fault-flows cancel out before reaching their respective detectors.
5A full derivation of dpT including affine arithmetic and error analysis details are presented in the separate supplementary material
for the interested reader in Appendix A.
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Offline/Online Split: Our approach consists of an offline phase and an online one (Figure 6). The user presents
the uninitialized input stencil and the range of intervals (in binades—meaning exponent spans) expected for each
input. In the offline phase we explore a rich search space. It is composed of the exponent binade ranges, and
protection goals defined by required precision accuracy and protection coverage. The goal is to obtain a best
fit detector configuration for a pair of (precision, coveraдe) for each exponent binade and populate a look-up
table for each application. Each application is identified by its unique coefficient set. Note that any change of
coefficients for a given stencil results in re-synthesis as a new application, creating a new entry in the lookup table.
In online phase, we scan the input to obtain an interval that maps to a canonical exponent binade range. This
allows FPDetect to query the LUT for any unseen data at runtime with user defined precision and coverage goals
to obtain a best fit detector configuration. Given these inputs, we can calculate the worst-case binade differences
present at the input. The binade difference influences Rs and Rd : the higher the worst-case binade differences at
the input, the worse Rs and Rd themselves are, and the lower the value of dpT . The goal of the offline phase is to
produces a look-up table (LUT) which has the guarantee of dpT bits at the detector output, provided the runtime
data lives within the binade differences upon which the stencil is “profiled.” The worst case binade difference is
extracted only at the beginning for the initialized input set in our experiments. Our rigorous guarantees are with
respect to these binade differences (a fact that can be optionally revalidated at runtime).
Protected Width: Our runtime goal is to not deploy the detectors at every time step, but only at every ρ time
steps (Figure 3, where x-axis corresponds to the grid points in the stencil evaluation) by certifying the correctness
of points within the ρ detection latency. Moreover, our goal is also to spatially distribute the detectors sparsely:
the ρ × Pw boxes shown in this figure capture this goal, and these boxes are stacked horizontally. To arrive at
these “stacking” optimizations, the user also provides the protection goals (user defined precision or udp defined
in §4). Then during the online phase, we can provide udp number of bits to be preserved in the computational
volume presented in each ρ × Pw box, provided dpT bits are guaranteed by the detector.
The actual stencil computation and detector deployment in a realistic problem are as presented in Table 2.
In particular, FPDetect can handle multiple computational arrays that iteratively update each other over time.
With respect to the parameters specified in Table 2, FPDetect automatically instantiates and configures the
requisite detectors. The pseudo-code in Figure 7 also presents the automatically inserted detect_errors() calls
corresponding to where the error is detected.
Figure 7 presents the pseudo-code for a stencil program operating on dense D-dimensional arrays. It involves
updating the “neighborhood” of each point of every array in a given region, denoted by ®l and ®u, with scaled values
from other arrays. The neighborhood used to update array Ax from array Ay is defined by the stencil S(x ,y). At
each time step t , every valid array index in each array x (i.e., bounded by ®lx and ®ux ) can be updated from the
array locations in the stencil neighborhood of all other arrays y using the coefficient function c(x,y). A distinct
stencil coefficient function can be defined for each pair of arrays in an update operation. A temporary array
TMP is employed to handle write-after-read dependencies in the array being updated. The DETECT_ERRORS()
instatntiates the required detectors for the corresponding time tile. In the case of program converging and
exiting before finishing the entire loop of the time tile, there is an extra set of trailing detectors instantiated by
DETECT_ERRORS at the loop exit for protection of the end segment of the computation.
Optimizations, and Overall Algorithm: As Figure 2 shows, we can determine a collection of inputs such as
[x − 4, t] that can be removed from consideration because they have no effect within dpT bits of precision. This
calculation is described in §4.
Our hope to leapfrog by T steps will not be realized unless we can “seal off” past computational points from
future consideration. In §5, provide the analysis underlying this strategy. In our example stencil, it will allow us to
shift the baseline by ρ steps as illustrated in Figure 3. The new baseline is obtained at ρ steps in the future while
T is the leapgrogging step. In fact, the following is an invariant for any detector instantiation: ∀(ρ,T ) : ρ ≤ T .
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1 //D−dimensional array type
2 usingMultiDimArray = ...;
3 //stencil routine on N multi−dimensional arrays
4 auto stencil(MultiDimArray A[N]) {
5 for(int t=0; ; t +=ρ) {
6 for(int tt=t; tt<t + ρ ; tt++) { //in one time tile
7 if(converged) {
8 DETECT_ERRORS(); //<−−(Detector−2)
9 return ;
10 }
11 for(int x=0; x<N; x++) { //every array
12 for(®i | ®l ≤ ®i ≤ ®h) //every valid index
13 for(int y=0; y<N; y++) //every RHS array
14 for(®s ∈ Sx,y ) //the stencil
15 TMP[®i] += cx,y (®s) ∗ A[y][®i + ®s]; //update
16 for(®i | ®l ≤ ®i ≤ ®h) //every valid index
17 A[x][®i] = TMP[®i];
18 } //for 'x'
19 } // for 'tt'
20 DETECT_ERRORS(); //<−−(Detector−1)
21 } // for 't'
22 }
Fig. 7. Stencil computation pseudo-code. A compiler can trans-
form the code in lines 11–19 into any equivalent form. Detector-1
is used throughout the computation at the time tile boundaries.
Detector-2 is used at the end of the computation.
Parameter Remark
®l = {l1, . . . , lD } lower bound of ar-
ray region
®u = {u1, . . . ,uD } upper bound of ar-
ray region
N number of arrays
ρ time tile size
Sx,y = { ®s1, . . . , ®sn} Stencil offsets to
update each point
of array Ax from
points in Ay
cx,y (®s) stencil coefficients
to update array Ax
using array Ay
Table 2. Stencil computation parameters. ®l , ®u, and ®si con-
tain integers. N ,T ∈ Z+. Implicitly, ∀®s < Sx,y : cx,y (®s) =
0. ∀®s,x ,y : cx,y (®s) ∈ [−1, 1].
Key highlights of our approach include: (1) rigorous floating-point precision analysis made possible by exploiting
the structured nature of our computations, (2) being able to define concepts such as essential (Ew ) and protected
(Pw ) widths that help us reduce the amount of computation necessary to achieve a certain level of protection,
and (3) cost analysis for optimal detector deployment (explained in §5) for a given amount of protection.
3 APPLICATIONS
FPDetect’s direct evaluation strategy has the ability to check bounds on the values generated in the stencil’s
computational space at runtime. This can help trap software level bugs that may be introduced during compiler
transformations. It also helps detect soft-errors within a thresholded precision limit providing robust and precise
coverage of the compute space for protection against silent data corruption (SDC).
3.1 Software Bug Detection
Loop optimization frameworks generate optimized code for stencil programs. Pluto [7] performs polyhedral
transformations that incorporate a host of optimizations to generate efficient code for stencils and other loop
programs. Pochoir [47] is a compiler to generate efficient implementations of stencil computations from a
high-level specification.
There has been a renewed interest, especially in the context of kernels such as stencils, in the generation of
optimized programs that exploit various architectures (CPUs, GPUs, ..), instruction sets, and customized hardware
such as FPGAs. The code generated by such tools needs to be checked to detect bugs in the toolchain early and
avoid errors creeping into production code. While one ideally desires a fully verified toolchain, developing such
toolchains is a non-trivial task. FPDetect can be used as part of the testing toolchain for these tools as they
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are developed. Thus, FPDetect can enable faulty compilers being identified and corrected before being used in
production environments. Specifically, compiler transformed programs can harbor bugs, as shown in the work
on Polycheck [3]. Prior efforts have studied the design of approaches to verify or check the correctness of code
generated by such optimizers [3, 39, 51]. These approaches detect bugs that impact the changes in control and
data flow, with limited support for semantic transformations. Unlike the control or data flow based approaches,
FPDetect is not limited by the nature of the transformations employed and carefully captures the semantics of
the stencil operations. On the downside, the analysis is imprecise in a different fashion than control or data flow
analysis, which are not affected by the floating point round-off errors.
We show that, with respect to the benchmarks chosen, commonly considered loop transformation bugs can be
trapped with around 2% overhead, allowing tested by unverified codes to be shipped to third-parties who may
keep the detectors turned on till gaining sufficient trust.
3.2 Soft-Error Detection
FPDetect is intrinsically designed and optimized to help protect applications by detecting SDCs with small
enough detection latecy. We consider a single event error model wherein a single error at some time t transiently
corrupts one or more values of one or more participating arrays in the computation resulting in a soft-error.
These errors are non-permanent (transient) in nature and cannot be replicated making them extremely difficult
to detect and isolate.
The soft error detectors generated using the FPDetect approach are, by construction, devoid of any modeling
bias unlike those are generated through machine learning [44, 46] or time-series data analysis methods [17]
which tend to reflect modeling bias. FPDetect’s detectors faithfully represent the evaluation of the stencil by
sampling the actual data space sparsely. It computes the output generated by a stencil application by faithfully
accounting for the precision contribution of each point in the detector’s dependence cone (as noted in Section 2).
FPDetect enables the user with a parametric knob called the user defined precision (udp) using which they
can define the required accuracy at the program output. Given a udp value of, say, 20, and a detector designed for
T-step direct evaluation with an error bound of dpT , FPDetect finds the minimal set of points which contribute at
least 20 bits of precision to retain dpT bits of precision at the detector.
We actually develop two detection strategies in the context of FPDetect. The first employs one direct evaluation
and the other employs two direct evaluations. The latter is necessary given that the last leapfrogging step may
not finish at a multiple of T steps; in those cases, the second direct evaluation provides the effect of a trailing
detector at the end of the stencil computation.
Single-direct detector:At time t0, direct evaluation is used to compute the estimated value of a pointAx [t0+T ][®i],
T time steps ahead. When the iterative stencil computation reaches time t0 +T and evaluates this point, it is
compared with the previously estimated value. If the two values differ more than can be ascribed to floating-point
round-off error, it indicates an error impacting either the direct evaluation or in some part of the iterative
evaluation leading to that point, triggering a soft-error detection event. This strategy involves a single additional
dot-product. The error is detected after T time steps, requiring that the computation executes at least till time
step t0 +T .
Double-direct detector: Values at two time steps t0 and t0+t ′ can be used to estimate a value at a future time
t0+T (T>t ′). This involves two direct evaluations, one each at time steps t0 and t0+t ′, whose estimates can be
compared in the latter of the two time steps. This allows flexible detection and does not require that the iterative
computation reach time t0+T . A mismatch between the two estimated values (beyond the bound on floating-point
round-off error) indicates an error in the computation between time steps t0 and t0 + t ′. This detection strategy
requires two dot products, potentially doubling the overhead. We minimize the overall overhead by using the
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single-direct detector as much as possible, and use the double-direct detector only at the expected end of the
computation (typically determined by monitoring convergence).
A crucial efficiency consideration built into FPDetect is that it detects soft errors by placing detectors at time-tile
boundaries (line 20 of Figure 7). This allows a programmer or an optimizer to transform the statements within
each time tile into any semantically equivalent form. For example, a polyhedral optimizer (e.g., Pluto [7] or
PolyOpt [50]) can optimize this stencil without interference from the detector.
4 OPTIMIZED DETECTOR SYNTHESIS
At a high level, FPDetect operates by comparing the iterative and direct evaluations within dpT bits of precision.
However, during the time interval t=t0 to t=t0 +T , not all points in the detector’s dependence cone contribute to
dpT bits of precision; this is because of the round-off effects of using (finite-precision) floating-point arithmetic.
This allows us to selectively carve out points from the input space. Two key concepts 6 introduced in this section—
namely that of Essential Width (Ew ) and Protected Width (Pw )—helps define the amount of computation that
can be carved out while still offering our guarantees. Later in §5, we describe an optimized detector synthesis
scheme based on these concepts.
FPDetect works by synthesizing detectors for the expected ranges of binades that the computation begins
with, and is also assumed to be present at every certified baseline. A T-step detector’s support comprises of
(2 ∗T ∗ ®w + 1) points centered around ®x , that is the points in XD = [®x − ®wT , ®x + ®wT ], where ®w represents the
footprint of one iteration of the stencil expressed as a vector to include higher dimensional spaces. Each point xi
in the XD belongs to the tightest encompassing interval I . Upon multiplying each xi by their respective T-step
coefficients, ci , generates separate intervals for each individual product term denoted as
[yi ,yi ] = [min(cixi , cixi ),max(cixi , cixi )]
This results in a new set of N points, Y = [y1,y2, . . . ,yN ], where N = (2T ®w + 1).
Define summation SY =
∑N
j=1[yj ,yj ] which falls in the interval [SY , SY ]. If [yi ,yi ] does not influence SY in
the scope of dpT , then point yi is a candidate for removal. We do this pointwise analysis for each yi . For this
we define, SY \i =
∑N
j=1,,i [yj ,yj ] and its bounds as [SY \i , SY \i ]. Now define dmin(yi ) as the distance between the
exponent of the lower bound of SY \i and the exponent of the upper bound for yi :
dmin(yi ) = max(0, exp(SY \i ) − exp(yi )) (3)
This equation and the next help check whether yi ’s maximal contribution manages to affect the minimal
contribution from all the remaining points (if not, due to the exponent differences, the magnitude contributed by
yi gets “shifted out” during the process of normalizing the exponents while doing floating-point addition):
maxContribp (yi , SY ) = p − dmin(yi ) (4)
Equation (4) gives the maximal precision contribution of point yi to the final sum SY when SY is computed up
to p precision bits. A yi becomes part of the exclusion set, ifmaxContrbp (yi , SY ) < 0. Note that yi = (ci × xi )
already includes one multiplicative term addding an extra half ulp error to the analysis.
Now, for a detector placed atAu [®x , t0+T ], we defineEssentialWidth (Ew ) as the width of themultidimensional
rectangular region around ®x such that the direct evaluation over Ew is sufficient to guarantee dpT precision at the
detector.7 Specifically, the region is defined by extents Ewl and Ewr such that Ew = Ewl + Ewr + 1. The caveat
from equation (4) is that all such excluded candidates could collectively affect the output within the precision
6These are presented in more detail as “Precision Driven Optimizations” in Appendix B of the supplementary material for the
interested reader.
7The word “sufficient” is important because we might, in general, have non-contiguous chunks of inputs that can be discarded. In
FPDetect, we extend Ew to make it a contiguous region.
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limits; therefore we must engage in an iterative process of considering subsets of points to carve out such that
equation (5) holds. In the general case, Ew is a vector and is written ®Ew . Figure 3 illustrates Ew for evaluation of
a 1-D stencil over T-steps.
Lemma 4.1. In the absence of an error, direct evaluation over the essential width (Ew ) ensures the correctness of
the computation to at least dpT bits of precision at the detector location.
For all points in the region excluded from Ew ∀X˜ : X˜ ⊂ ([®x ± ®wT ] − ®Ew ), the following holds
∀xi ∈ X˜ :maxContribdpT
(∑
(yi = ci × xi ), SY
)
≤ 0 (5)
One form of false positives involves detection of soft errors when no error affects any iteration point on which
the detector depends (aka the detector’s dependence cone). The preceding lemma guarantees that, despite the
reduced evaluation cost, in the absence of errors affecting the dependence code, the direct evaluation is equivalent
to the iterative evaluation within dpT bits and no soft error notification (false alarms) is triggered.
Covering multiple points with a single detector: ProtectedWidth (Pw ): As depicted in Figure 5, each point
inside the dependence cone of the detector has varying contribution depending on its effective path contribution.
To guarantee that an error affecting a bit at an iteration point is detected by a detector protecting it, the minimum
contribution of that bit must impact the dp bits at the detector. This will result in the values computed by iterative
and direct evaluation being different, triggering a soft error notification.
To quantify the minimal possible influence a yi has on the final sum SY , we define another distance metric
dmax(yi ) as the distance between the exponent of the upper bound of SY \i and the lower bound of yi .
dmax(yi ) = max(0, exp(SY \i ) − exp(yi )) (6)
Then, the minimal influence yi has on the final sum when computed correct to dpT bits of precision is evaluated
as
minContribdpT (yi , SY ) = dpT − dmax(yi ) (7)
A detector’s reach can then be configured to guarantee an user defined precision (udp) by carving out a set
Yudp from X such that:
Yudp = [yi :minContribdpT (yi , SY ) ≥ udp, yi ∈ Y ] (8)
The most significant udp bits of precision of each point inside Yudp is then protected if SY is evaluated correctly
to dpT bits of precision. Equation (8) leads to our primary soft-error detection model that provides the guarantee
that an error affecting within the most significantudp bits of points insideYudp is detected. In our stencil model, for
a detector placed at Au [®x , t0 +T ], we define Protected Width (Pw (T , ρ,udp)) as the width of a multidimensional
rectangular region centered around ®x such that with respect to a detector placed at time t0+T and spatial position
®x , for each ®p ∈ ®x ± Pw (T , ρ,udp) at time t0+ρ, the above guarantee holds.
Lemma 4.2. An error affecting any of the MSB udp bits of a point inside the protected width is detected.
For a point yi in y, if yi belongs to Yudp and its minimal precision contribution is pi at the final output,
then pi ≥ udp. If yi ∈ [yi ,yi ], then an error, erryi affecting within the MSB udp bits will be bounded by
erryi ≥ 2exp(yi )−pi+1. Since, we are matching dpT bits at the detector, hence the threshold of detectable error is
bounded by 2exp(SY )−dp+1.
For our guarantee to hold, generated error ≥ error threshold. This means 2exp(yi )−pi+1 ≥ 2exp(SY )−dpT +1.
Taking logarithms and simplifying the above terms leads to the following relation that must hold true for all
points inside the Pw region: exp(SY ) − exp(yi ) ≤ dpT − pi , and udp ≤ pi ≤ dpT − (exp(SY ) − exp(yi )).
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In determining the protected region, where a detector is used to protect iteration points in multiple time steps,
we choose ρ such that the protected width chosen at ρ is also valid for all time points t0 ≤ t ≤ t0 + ρ:
∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ ρ : Pw (T , ρ,udp) ≤ Pw (T , t ,udp) (9)
This enclosed region forms the protected region for the given detector location. Figure 3 illustrates the protected
region in terms of Pw and ρ steps for a given udp.
Probabilistic detection:While the above strategy guarantees detection, the stencil structure and user-specified
udp requirements can severely constrain the protection region, incurring high detection overheads. To further
trade-off overheads for detection capability, we consider a detector that only provides the detection guarantee
on only a fraction of the points in the protected region associated with a detector. Given a specified coverage
requirement cov , we choose the protected width Pw such that the fraction of points with guaranteed protection is
at least cov . An error impacting the MSB udp bits of an iteration point is guaranteed to detected by its enclosing
detector, if it is among the points for which the detection is guaranteed. Alternatively, such an error is detected
with probability of at least cov .
5 OPTIMIZED DETECTOR PLACEMENT
Dampening errors: We consider a single event fault model wherein a single fault occurring at time t can
transiently corrupt one or more participating arrays. Based on properties discussed in the preceding section,
an error at time t escaping detection by the nearest set of detectors must have impacted less significand bits.
Suppose the coefficient set C = {ci }ni=1 denotes the set of forward contributions of a point in the stencil. Then
Lemmas- 5.1 and 5.2 given below hold under the following assumptions:
• ∀i, |ci | ≤ 1 : This implies all forwards contributions move the error magnitude towards the least significant
bits
• ∑i ci ≤ 1 : The collective error spread from an affected point to all neighboring points in the forward path
is less than equal to itself
• There is no error cancellation within the scope of a detector. Multiple detectors may trigger a detection
event as long as the triggering errors are localized to the scope of those detectors without any intervening
error cancellations from its neighbors.8
The first two conditions are driven by the stability criterions and smoothening impact of the stencil.
Lemma 5.1. An error may never amplify in the forward path.
Lemma 5.2. Error dampening guarantees an error missing detection does not affect future computations within the
required precision limits.
Under the dampening error model, the detectors can be arranged to cover the iteration space as follows:
• Certified baselines: Error dampening allows us treat all computations up to a time t that have passed the
error detection checks as effectively being error-free. We will use these checked points at a given time step
t as the new certified baseline to perform direct evaluation of the next detector.
• Horizontal detector placement: If a set of detectors is placed horizontally, i.e., at the same time step t , Pw
apart in all dimensions, then the points at time t , once they pass the detection checks, will constitute
a new certified baseline. Thus for a d−dimensional stencil of size N={Ni }di=1 along each dimension, if
the detectors are placed Pw={pwi }di=1 apart along each dimension, the number of detectors required is∏d
i=1(Ni/pwi ).
8Such cancellations, if they occur, do not affect the final output.
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Fig. 8. Detector arrangement for a 1-d stencil. Horizontal: array elements; vertical: time steps
• Vertical detector placement: stacking. Because the detector characteristics are influenced by the input range,
at every baseline the input range needs to be computed. Alternatively, a bound on the input range can
be predetermined based on the initial/boundary conditions and used for the entire computation. In both
scenarios, the detectors can be vertically stacked to create new certified baselines as execution moves
forward.
Illustration: Figure 8 illustrates the placement of detectors for the first two certified baselines for a 1-d stencil.
D01, D02, etc. show the placement of the first set of detectors at time step T. These are computed from the array
values at time step 0. D11, . . ., the second set of detectors at time T + ρ, computed from the certified baseline at
time step ρ. The detectors are vertically spaced ρ time steps apart, and horizontally spaced Pw apart. The protected
regions are marked as squares and labeled at the right top. For example, P01 is the region protected by detector
D01. The shaded region denotes the boundary region unprotected by the detectors. Of this region, the shaded
gray region has no influence on the detectors protecting points in that time step (outside their dependence cones).
Errors in this region are not detected. The remaining region has an influence on at least one of the detectors.
Errors in these iteration points might be detected, but are not part of the guaranteed coverage.
%cov =
d∏
i=1
(
Ni − 2wT
Ni
)
∗ 100
(10)
Boundaries: Although our method is applicable to the boundary points,
the contributions from the boundary points need to computed differently
from the interior, incurring additional overhead. For cases where time de-
pendent boundary conditions and Neumann boundary conditions [2] exists,
FPDetect lacks prior knowledge of how the boundary points are forced in
the intermediate time tiles. For fixed Dirichlet boundary conditions we can
provide full coverage. To simplify the implementation, we ignore protection for the boundary regions in the
generalized cases. Specifically, any computation point influenced by the boundary between certified baselines is
not checked. Note that this reduces the maximum possible coverage to be below 100% , however still providing
an accurate bound on the guaranteed coverage per equation (10) akin to probabilistic coverage that exemplifies
the flexibility afforded by trade-off detection quality versus cost.
An error affecting such an unprotected region can spread to the rest of the computation space and result in
erroneous output. This is akin to probabilistic coverage, with the probability of detection reduced by fraction of the
total computation space left unprotected at the boundaries. Let Ni denote the problem size along i ′th-dimension
in a d-dimensional problem. Equation (10) expresses the percentage of covered region for a detectors instantiated
with Tstep = T . Here,w is the stencil width9.
9The implementation uses the exact expression, accounting for stencil asymmetry and non-Cartesian shapes.
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Optimal detector configuration: For a given choice of detector, the essential width Ew is a function of the
T step, the input exponent range, and the detector precision (dp). Pw additionally depends on udp and ρ. The cost
function is evaluated as the relative cost with respect to the actual stencil evaluation. Section 6.1 details the cost
function and the offline analysis used to construct optimal detector configurations.
6 OVERALL ALGORITHM
FPDetect performs an offline manuever to obtain a look-up table with optimal detectors configurations for the
detectors. For each anticipated choice of udp, probability of detection, and anticipated input range, the offline
analysis (§6.2) determines the detector configuration to be used during online execution. A detector configuration
consists of: T, the distance at which the single-direct detector is evaluated; ρ, the number of iterations between
certified baselines; Ew , the essential width to evaluate the detector; Detector coefficients for the support in
the essential width; and Pw the spatial separation between detectors in the same time step. These parameters
completely specify the detector configuration at runtime.
6.1 Offline Determination of Detector Configurations
Constraints on detector configuration:We use offline analysis to efficiently identify optimal detector config-
urations for use during online execution. To constrain the search space of possible configurations, we use an
upper-bound on the Tstep (say, Tmax = 256 in our evaluation) that one might use for the detector evaluation.
Larger Tstep values are useful and often minimize the detector operational cost. However, this requires larger
coefficient sets, needed for the direct evaluation, to be stored in memory. For a d−dimensional stencil with
N−arrays, the space overhead encountered to store the effective coefficient space is O(N ·T d+1max ). The range of
udp values to be considered is bounded by the number of bits (1 − 53) and the maximum precision (dp) that
can be preserved by both direct and iterative stencil evaluations informed by the round-off error analysis. We
determine the detector configurations for a finite set of coverage choices between 0% and 100%, corresponding
to the fraction of points in a detector’s protected region that are protected to the desired udp bits. The actual
coverage including the boundary is computed online.
Relativized input exponent ranges: Consider two exact floating point numbers represented in triplet form
as af = (sa ,ma , ea) and bf = (sb ,mb , eb ) where the mantissama andmb are represented in p = 53 bits. For a
floating point addition (subtraction), the mantissa of the number with the lower of the two exponents has to
be shifted by |ea − eb | to match their exponent values. Thus, the binary addition (subtraction) of the mantissa
depends the relative distance between the exponents for shifting (not on actual exponents).
In stencils, update rules are modeled as weighted sums involving only addition (subtraction based on sign) and
multiplication. Multiplication by exact scalars involves binary multiplication of the mantissa, followed by addition
of the exponent terms, maintaining linearity in the exponents. For example, let the coefficients associated with
af and bf be α1 = (sα1 ,mα1 , eα1 ) and α2 = (sα2 ,mα2 , eα2 ), respectively. The product α1af will have an exponent of
(eα1 + ea) and α2bf will have (eα2 + eb ). Thus, the relative distance of exponents between these two terms will
|(eα1 − eα2 )+ (ea − eb )| which depends essentially on the coefficient’s exponents (that remain unchanged) and the
relative operand exponent differences.
This fact can be utilized to map different interval ranges to some canonical exponent range that models the
maximum relative distance of points inside the interval. To do this, we scan the input to find the smallest data
point (in magnitude) and the largest data point (in magnitude) and characterize that interval with the exponent
difference between these two data points. For an input interval, if (ma , ea) represents the smallest value (in
magnitude) and (mb , eb ) is the largest value (in magnitude) seen in the interval, then factoring out ea produces
the following mapping
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[(ma , ea), (mb , eb )] ≡ (1, ea)[(ma , 0), (mb , eb − ea)]
We can further factor out the corresponding mantissa and increment the mapped exponent interval width by 1
to have a larger bounding interval for the given input range. Since our analysis is conservative, bounds that hold
for larger exponent ranges also hold for smaller exponent ranges.
[(ma , ea), (mb , eb )] ≡ (ma , ea)[(1, 0), (ma
mb
, eb − ea)] ≡ [(1, 0), (1, eb − ea + 1)] (11)
The operation of a stencil on an input range can be relativized to a small number of canonical exponent
ranges. This allows us to use the offline analysis performed on specific exponent ranges on different set of actual
exponents that belong to the same range. In our experimental setup, we profiled exponent ranges form 0 through
20 (expmax = 20). The maximum udp is set as 40. Given the range of exponents and udp choices, the offline
algorithm construct a lookup table that returns a 5-tuple (T , ρ,dp, Pw ,Ew ) corresponding to an optimal detector
configuration for the given interval, required udp, and minimum detection probability.
Offline algorithm:10 We consider all T and ρ such that T ≤ Tmax, ρ < T . For a d-dimensional stencil, Pw
is d-dimensional vector, corresponding to protected region of iteration points centered at the detector. Ew is
represented by a rectangular region with a computed number of points along left and right of the detector
along each direction. The cost function is derived as the ratio of the total detector overhead to the total cost of
the stencil application evaluation. Post simplification of the cost function for a 5-tuple detector configuration
(exp,udp,T , ρ,Coe f f s) is given as
Cost =
1
ρ
d∏
i=1
(
ewi
pwi
)
(12)
derived fraction of overhead cost to total stencil compute cost. Even though the tuple
elements exp, T , udp, and Coe f f s do not explicitly appear in the cost function, they
implicitly influence the cost through Ew and Pw .
The algorithm takes as input parameters for which an offline profiles need to be
determined: the maximum number of time steps (Tmax), the set of input ranges (as
exponents in exp_set), set of udp values (as udp_set), and probabilistic coverage values
(cov_set). The algorithm determines the configurations one input range choice at a time. Using floating-point
round-off analysis, the maximum number of bits that will be preserved for each possible time step t is computed
(as maxdp). For each t , the cost of evaluating each detector is computed as the product of the Ewdimensions
to guarantee maxdp[t] bits of precision of the direct evaluation t time steps away. Then, for each candidate
protected region, the fraction of points with guaranteed coverage of b bits (where b is a candidate udp in the
input parameter udp_set) is computed. If this fraction is greater than a desired coverage and if the associated cost
is lower than that of any configuration seen thus far, this configuration is chosen. After evaluating all feasible
solutions, the algorithm returns the last chosen configurations.
The cost of the offline procedure is dominated by dimensionality of the space to be explored. While this
exhaustive evaluation of every feasible configuration can be expensive, for the benchmarks considered (in the
next section), each offline procedure completes within several minutes. Search-space exploration techniques
might further lower this cost.
10The algorithmic listing is available in the supplementary material (Appendix C).
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Parabolic (heat):
∂u
∂t = ∇2u(x, y) + f
α = 3, ζ = 1.2
[Dirichlet initial/boundary condition]
h1. f = ζ − 2 − 2α , u = 1 + x 2 + αy2 + ζ t
h2. f = 0 , u = 1 + x 2 + αy2 + ζ t
h3. f = 2ζ − 2 − 2α ,
u = 1 + x 2 + αy2 + ζ t 2
[Neumann initial/boundary condition] f = 0
h4. u(x, y, t ) = e−π 2t/2 sin π ( x+y2 )
h5. u(x, y, t ) = 4 + e−π 2t/2 cos π ( x+y2 )
h6. u(x, y, t ) = 2 +
e−π 2t/2
[
sin π ( x+y2 ) + cos π ( x+y2 )
]
Poisson equation:
− ∂2u
∂x 2 − ∂
2u
∂y2 = RHS
[Dirichlet initial/boundary condition]
p1. RHS = −6, u = 1 + x 2 + y2
p2. RHS = −6(2 + x + y), u = 1 + x 3 + y3
p3. RHS = −2 − 12y, u = 1 + x 2 + 2y3
[Deflection in a membrane]
p1 = 4e−5((x−0.6)
2+(y−0.6)2)
p2 = 2e−5((x−0.3)
2+(y−0.3)2)
p3 = 4e−5((x−0.3)
2+(y−0.6)2)
p4. RHS = p1, u = 0
p5.RHS = p1 + p2, u = 0
p6. RHS = p1 + p2 + p3, u = 0
[Neumann initial/boundary condition]
p7. RHS = 10e−
(x−0.5)2+(y−0.5)2
0.02 , ∂u∂n (x, y) = − sin(5x )
p8. RHS = 0, ∂u∂n (x, y) = − sin(5x )
p9. RHS = 20e−
(x−0.25)2+(y−0.25)2
0.01 , ∂u∂n (x, y) = − sin(5x )
Hyperbolic (Second-order wave):
∂2u
∂t 2 (x, y, t ) = c2∇2u(x, y, t )
[initial/boundary conditions: c = 1, ∂u∂t = 0]
w1. u(x, y, t ) =
cos(√2π t ) sin(πx ) sin(πy) + x 2 − y2
w2. u(x, y, t ) =
sin(√2π t ) cos(πx ) cos(πy) + x 2 − y2
w3. u(x, y, t ) =
sin(√2π t ) cos(πx ) cos(πy) + x 2 − y2
[initial and boundary conditions: c = 0.7,
∂u
∂t = 0]
w4. u(x, y, t ) = 16 +
2 sin( π4 x ) sin( π4 y) cos( π2 c2t )
w5. u(x, y, t ) = 16 +
sin( π2 x ) sin( π2 x ) cos( π4 c2t )
w6.u(x, y, t ) = 16 +
2 sin( π2 x ) cos( π4 x ) sin( π2 c2t )
Hyperbolic (convection diffu-
sion):
∂u
∂t + α∇u(x, y) = ζ ∇2u(x, y)
initial/boundary condition from
u(x, y, t ) =
1
4t+1 e
−(x−α t−0.5)2−(y−at−0.5)2
ζ (4t+1)
c1. α = 0.8, ζ = 0.01
c2. α = 0.4, ζ = 0.4
c3. α = 0.1, ζ = 0.8
Fig. 9. Benchmark PDEs (p1–p9,h1–h6,w1–w3,c1–c3) solved using the stencil finite-difference method. Initial and boundary
conditions are derived from the equations provided. All stencils span the [0, 1] spatial domain and are run 4000 time steps.
6.2 Online Detector-Embedded Execution
We briefly discuss the algorithm10 to obtain the detector configurations and embed the detectors within the
original stencil code. During online deployment of FPDetect’s detectors, the input values are scanned to compute
the input exponent range to be handled in the floating-point space. To account for the unprotected boundary
regions, FPDetect maps user’s input coverage value to an equivalent internal coverage value (as in_cov) that
corresponds to the detection probability on the grid excluding the boundaries. The adjustment is done with the
guarantee that the fraction of points covered due to (in_cov) is at least as many required by cov over the entire
computation space. If FPDetect fails to find an equivalent mapping, it conveys an error message for unsupported
coverage. The input range, user-specified udp, and modified detection probability (in_cov) are used to lookup the
detector configuration.
After an initial evaluation of the detector and the stencil for ρ iterations, the execution of the stencil is split into
two segments: iterations till the next detector evaluation (eval_detector) and iterations till the next detector
check (detector_check). Thus, the stencil is executed with interleaved detector evaluation and checking. Note
that the algorithm assumes ρ is greater than half the detector evaluation T-step. This scenario requires at most
two “live”, i.e., unchecked detectors per spatial position in the iteration space, at any time. If not, at each spatial
position, multiple detectors need to be evaluated and retained until they are checked. When all iterations have
been executed, the iterations past the last certified baseline need to be checked. These leftover iterations are
checked using the trailing detection strategy.
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7 EVALUATION
Benchmarks:We evaluate FPDetect on the stencil kernels shown in Figure 9. We choose a set of benchmark
problems from elliptic, parabolic, and hyperbolic PDEs evaluated as stencils using the explicit finite difference
method. Benchmark examples considered are Poisson equation with different combinations of Dirichlet and
Neumann boundary conditions, heat equation with different initial and boundary conditions, and second-order
wave and convection-diffusion equations. Our error analysis and optimization techniques are based on the input
data interval and not the exact values. We test our hypothesis rigorously by exercising each benchmark equation
with multiple initial and boundary conditions. In addition to the exponent and sign bits, fault-injection-based
evaluation was conducted for a user-defined precision of 15 mantissa bits. This corresponds to a total protection
of 27 most significant bits.
Experimental setup: All benchmarks are compiled using ICC 18.0.5 with -qopenmp -O3 options and executed
on dual 14-core Intel Xeon CPU E5-2680v4 2.60GHz CPUs system (total 28 processor cores) with 64GB of RAM.
The Pluto optimized code were generated with ‘PLUTO version 0.11.4-350-g8debc44’.
Detector coverage excluding boundaries: To reduce the complexity of the detection strategy, we did not
protect statement instances impacted by the boundary between certified baselines. This limits the maximum
coverage that can be guaranteed by our implementation. For all benchmarks and configurations evaluated, we
observed this fraction to be greater than 90% of the computation space, demonstrating the simplification does not
significantly limit detection ability.
Space overheads: At stencil runtime, FPDetect requires space to store:
• the set of all possible coefficients of interest,
• the direct evaluation configurations for specific input ranges and precision needs, and
• the result of the selective direct evaluation by each detector.
We bound the offline analysis with Tmax=256 iterations and require the full coefficient set for T=0 to Tmax.
This allows a runtime choice of time tile size between 1 and 256. This incurs a space overhead of 128MB. While
incurring a large memory footprint, only a fraction of this data–one rectangular portion the single-direct detector–
is used during online execution and the accessed portions are reused for all detectors at a time step. In addition,
the trailing detector accesses one rectangular portion determined by the number of iterations not executed by
the last tile. This results in good cache behavior, limiting their impact on overall performance.
The offline configuration lookup table is built by profiling over 20 exponents, 40 udp and coverage values from
0 to 100% (in increments of 5%). Thus, the offline lookup table is indexed by a 3-tuple of (exp,udp, cov), with each
lookup returning a 6-tuple configuration of (T , ρ,dp, ®Pw , ®Ewl , ®Ewr ), where ®Ewl , ®Ewr , and ®Pw are d−dimensional
vectors for a d−dimensional stencil program. Here, ®Ewl and ®Ewr corresponds to the left and right extents of
Ew .11 FPDetect scans the data at runtime to determine the necessary exponent range. This is combined with
the user-specified precision and coverage to index the lookup table and obtain the corresponding detector
configuration. For a 2-dimensional problem, a key-value pair in the table occupies a space of 48 bytes. Over all
the profiled configurations, the configuration lookup table requires a total space of ≈750KB per benchmark.
In addition to the coefficients and the lookup table, we require one floating-point number per array at each
detector location to store the value computed through selective direct evaluation. The maximum number of
instantiated detectors comes to around 387K for the wave benchmarks. For most other benchmarks is around
100K for a problem size of 10K×10K and Tmax= 256.
11 ®Ewl and ®Ewr are equal in the case of symmetric stencils.
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Fig. 10. Detection rates of single bit-flip error injections in bits protected (left) and unprotected (right) by the detector (A.M.:
arithmetic mean; G.M.: geometric mean)
7.1 Software Bug Detection
We evaluate the effectiveness of FPDetect in detecting logical errors injected into the code generated for the
stencil programs in Table 9 optimized by Pluto [8]. Specifically, we inject three classes of bugs injected in the
evaluation of PolyCheck [3], a tool designed to check errors introduced by loop transformers: incorrect loop
bounds, invalid array accesses, and invalid loop reorderings.
For each software bug introduced, we evaluated its impact using bitwise comparison of the result with that of
the non-buggy version. Any mismatch is treated as a bug. Some bugs might not result in an erroneous result for
the problem instances evaluated. FPDetect cannot aid in their detection.
The bugs introduced in the source potentially affect multiple runtime operations, making them easier to detect
that soft errors. Exploiting this, we evaluate FPDetect’s effectiveness in detecting software bugs when deployed
with a small udp value of 4. For each benchmark, the default deteector precision (dp) determined for this udp is
used in the evaluation.
Pluto-generated code: To generate optimized versions using Pluto, we implemented all the stencils in the form
of affine loop nests enclosed in scop pragmas. This code input to Pluto has consists of median 53 source lines of
code (SLOC)12 per benchmark. Pluto takes these scop-annotated benchmarks as input to generate optimized
versions with median 1157 SLOC. The median of the number of loops in the transformed code was 365 across all
the benchmarks with a median nesting depth of 6. In checking such large and complex generated codes, tools
such as FPDetect are essential.
Loop bound and array access bugs: We automated the injection of loop bound bugs. For loop bounds, the
injected bug either offsets the lower bound by one in the positive direction or offsets the upper bound by one in
the negative direction. We automated the injection of array access bugs. Specifically, array accesses were made
incorrect by either dividing or multiplying the indexing term by two.
False positives: Some bugs do not result in any difference in our bitwise comparison of the result with the
non-buggy version. Therefore, our approach incurs no false positives in our evaluation. This is because some
source-level bugs do not manifest at runtime. For example, a loop iterator might be constrained by multiple
loop bounds (e.g., min or max of multiple expressions), with the loop bound never reaching the error-injected
expressions.13 In a situation with multiply nested loops where the indexing for an inner loop depends conditionally
on outerloop indices, a bug impacting the outer loop bound doesn’t often affect the inner loop and hence doesn’t
impact the stencil’s output.
12Source lines of code are measured using sloccount tool
13An example can be found in the supplementary material in Appendix D.
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Table 3 summarizes FPDetect’s bug detection effectivness for the above two categories of bugs. The table
only lists detection percentages when the bitwise comparison with the non-buggy version flags an error-injected
version as being in error.
Table 3. Software bug detection results.
Loop bound Array access Loop bound Array access
#SL #RL %det #SL #RL %det #SL #RL %det #SL #RL %det
H1 374 374 100 300 267 99 H2 370 370 100 300 258 100
H3 374 374 100 300 267 98 H4 486 106 99 300 26 100
H5 486 106 100 300 26 100 H6 486 106 100 300 26 100
P1 10 10 100 18 17 100 P2 12 12 100 18 17 100
P3 12 12 100 18 17 100 P4 370 310 100 300 223 87
P5 370 310 96 300 223 82 P6 370 310 96 300 223 82
P7 414 104 98 300 48 97 P8 416 104 100 300 44 98
P9 416 104 98 300 44 98 W1 360 280 100 300 215 55
W2 360 280 44 11 6 54 W3 360 350 31 300 266 45
W4 260 280 45 300 215 60 W5 360 280 53 300 215 62
W6 360 350 100 300 266 100 C1 360 360 100 300 262 100
C2 360 360 100 300 262 100 C3 360 360 100 300 262 100
The #SL enumerate all the possible source locations for the types of bug injected. #RL enumerates the number of
source locations that were reached at runtime. %det denotes the fraction of errors flagged by bitwise comparison
with correct execution that was detected by FPDetect. We observe that FPDetect has a high but not perfect
detection rate. We investigated the scenarios in which FPDetect missed detection and all of them were a result
of the logical error having a low impact on the stencil’s output. Specifically, the impacted point’s effect on the
stencil was beyond the required detector precision (dp) evaluated by our conservative error analysis.
To illustrate, consider two caseswhere FPDetect detect such an impact and anotherwhere it escapes FPDetect’s
detection. In the first case, the detector evaluates to the expected value to 0x40101b539cbac780 (we present in hex
values for readability), while the bug affected stencil computes 0x40101b53a11cf49f. They match in the first 23
bits of the mantissa. This example, evaluated forW 1 has dp = 30, hence is trapped. In the second scenario, detector
evaluate the expected value to 0x4004178de3e4ab00 while the buggy stencil evaluates 0x4004178de3e4aac4,
differing in only the last 9 bits of mantissa. Given the low detector precision of 30 for wave benchmarks, this
error goes undetected. In general, our conservative error analysis and low udp choice predicts only upto dp bits
at the detector, attributing precision beyond dp bits to round-off errors. While this leads to missed detection
opportunities, we still observe high detection rates.
Loop order bugs: Unlike changes to array accesses and loop bounds, changing loop orders required non-local
changes to the Pluto-generated code. Therefore, we handcrafted the error injected versions. The handcrafted
scenarios included swapping nested loop pairs and re-ordering of non-nested loop blocks. The optimized codes
included a maximum of 360 nested for loops with a maximum loop nesting depth of 11. Testing all possible
combinations of loop reorderings will be prohibitively expensive. We limited our testing to 15 loop order bug
injections per benchmark.
Across all benchmarks, a median of 3 injected bugs per benchmark did not result in a bitwise difference in the
output. This could either be due to the reordered version being correct due to commutativity of loops, or the
error being too small to persist under finite precision arithmetic for the inputs chosen. These bugs were also not
detected by FPDetect. Other than benchmarks W1 andW3, loop order bugs injected in all other benchmarks were
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detected. In W1 and W3, there was one injected bug in each that resulted in the bitwise comparison flagging an
error was not detected by FPDetect. In both cases, the difference was within 8 least significant bits (corresponding
to < 10−12 relative error), and could not distinguished from floating point round-off errors.
In summary, we observe that FPDetect can detect a large class of software bugs with a low udp of as low as 4
bits. In all cases evaluated, we observed negligible overheads (< 2%), making it a useful component in a test suite
or as a low cost online checking tool for flagging systematic errors. As observed earlier, increasing the udp and
dp can improve the percentage of bugs detected, at the cost of greater runtime overheads. Note the a change
of udp only changes the number of points being sampled for detection. The Pw corresponding to this udp only
decides the relative distance between the sampled points.
Soft error detection:We performed fault injection experiments to validate the coverage guarantees provided
by FPDetect. Single bit flips were injected in the kernel source code by corrupting array locations involved in
the stencil computation. Such a fault model abstracts the cause of the fault to an anomalous behaviour in data
evolution. FPDetect is designed to detect an anomalous behaviour in data evolution with a precision guarantee
irrespective of where it originates as long as it impacts the computation. The time steps and bit locations subject
to injection were selected randomly with equal probability across the iteration space, array index space, and bit
locations. The bit flips were injected with equal probability on all array locations, including the unprotected
boundaries. Each benchmark was exercised through a fault injection campaign comprising of 10, 000 executions
to determine the detection rate. In the reported results, FPDetect was evaluated for detector configurations
guaranteeing 15 bits of mantissa precision (total of most significant 27 bits including 11 exponent bits and 1 sign
bit) with a coverage of 60–90%.
We observe that, across all benchmarks and including the boundary region, errors injected within the most
significant udp bits (the guaranteed protection) were detected 92–99% of the cases for the 90% coverage, and
78–90% of the cases for the 60% coverage configuration. We observed similar trends when multiple errors are
injected, at multiple and randomly selected locations in the iteration space. Figure 10 shows the detection rates
for the two coverage scenarios when only considering error affecting the protected region (the most significant
15 bits, labeled “protected”) and only those affecting the unprotected region (labeled “unprotected”). Furthermore,
we observe that flips in bits beyond the unprotected region (not guaranteed to be detected) were detected on
average 26% (13%) of the cases for 90% (60%) coverage scenario. Hence, even with a conservative configuration
for guaranteeing user-defined bits of protection, in practice, our approach empirically protects a larger fraction of
the computation space and error scenarios.
Recent studies [? ] show that single-bit errors yield a higher percentage of SDCs in most cases, compared to
multi-bit errors. In cases of data corruption, two or more bit flips in the opposite direction, can reduce the overall
error magnitude thus filtering it out of the detectable range. We performed a small scale multi bit-flip experiment
to check FPDetect’s detection ability in such scenarios over a selected number of representative benchmarks
for a coverage guarantee of 90%. Furthermore, the space of multi bit-flip errors is seemingly large. We restrict
ourselves to double bit-flip errors. Each injection campaign executed at a random time step, splits the data array
into 16 byte sections and selects one section randomly within which 2 randoms bits are flipped.
For multi bit-flip campaigns including atleast one bit flipped inside the protected range, errors were detected
in 88-99% of the cases. Furthermore, multi bit-flips encountered outside the protection range were detected on
average for 36% of the cases. Hence, even though our guarantees are restricted to single bit errors, empirically
the detectors can handle multi bit errors.
Comparative study: Our detector synthesis strategy provides a variety of tuning knobs for flexibility in terms
of minimum precision and protection coverage with precise bounds. To ascertain the effectiveness of our tool,
we compare them with two state-of-the-art soft error detectors, AID [17] and SSD [45], which build data value
centric model for soft error detection.
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SSD builds an epsilon-insensitive support vector machine regression model to detect SDCs. As spatial features,
it includes values of a given point’s neighboring data points as the training data. It runs into scalability issues by
requiring the generation of data traces of every point in the simulation over all time steps before being fed to
the learning model. We had to scale down the problem to a small size of 1k points per dimension. It learns the
classifier first, triggering false positives for early stages of the simulation trace. In particular, we encountered
false positives in initial one to five iterations. Hence, we devised the fault injection mechanism after atleast
10 iterations have passed. SSD did not trigger a detection in any of our error-injected runs past the first 10
iterations. We believe, in these benchmarks, the variations observed in the first few iterations make SSD consider
the error-injected behavior appear normal.
AID is an adaptive SDC detector wherein a best-fit prediction model gets selected adaptively based on local
online data. AID faired better with our benchmarks than SSD. However, the detection rates and overheads
were extremely conservative. The comparative analysis by Kestor et al. [31] reports significant slowdown at
a maximum of 1.4× for AID when snapshots were taken for every time step. We observed similar overheads
when taking snapshots at every step. To reduce the overhead, we performed two experiments with snapshot
every 3 steps and every 10 steps. In the former case, AID reported similar overheads averaging around 80% with
a maximum detection rate of 54%. In the latter case, the overhead reduced to the 20 − −30% range, while the
average detection rate was around 25% with a maximum and minimum of 37% and 21%, respectively.
Sequential overheads: Figure 11 shows the sequential execution overheads of our detection approach for three
udp-coverage configurations: 10, 15, and 20 bits. We observe that the overhead depends on the user-required
coverage guarantee, with overheads, in general, below 10% for udp=15 and 80% coverage, for heat, Poisson,
and convection-diffusion benchmarks. Overall, we observe that protecting additional bits or providing greater
coverage increases the overhead. All wave benchmarks (and some Poisson benchmarks for 90% coverage) incur
far greater overheads, reaching over 60% for udp of 20 bits and 90% coverage. This is due to the nature of the
stencils that, as discuss below, leads to a sharp reduction in the protected region (Figure 12). Despite this increase,
these results demonstrate the approach’s flexibility in supporting low detection guarantees when a reduced
overhead is desired.
Scalability: Figure 15 shows the scalability of the baseline and detector-embedded versions on up to 24 threads
using OpenMP. Across all benchmarks, both variants achieve similar speedups, demonstrating that the detectors
do not interfere with efficient parallel execution. While not shown here, we observed similar trends (in terms of
low overheads) with various thread counts for other user-defined precision and coverage values.
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four benchmarks.
For the wave(“W”) benchmarks which model hyperbolic PDE equations we encounter reduced scalability for
stricter configurations of high udp and coverage. We believe this is due to higher udp values requiring more
detectors. This coupled with the larger Ew results in potentially increased cache contention and hence the
associated reduced scalability.
Summarizing the overheads, Figure 13 shows the distribution of overheads for 80% coverage and three udp
values. Figure 14 shows the distribution of overheads for a fixed udp (20) and three different coverage percentages.
In both cases, we observe greater coverage percentage or udp requirement can increase overheads. However, the
median overhead remains close to 5% and does not increase with scale.
Table 4 summarizes the optimal configuration, detection rates and overhead factors for user defined protection
goals requiring udp = 20 and 90% coverage. We select the summary for a subset of the example benchmarks that
have shown the largest variations in their configuration and detection rates in their class of numerical kernels.
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Benchmark optimal config % det % Seq ovh Scalability factor
(T,dpT ) (ew,pw) single bit Multi bit k=2 k=8 k=24
H1 (254,39) (63,14) 96.14 94.66 8.0 1.76 6.18 12.41
H4 (256,38) (63,14) 90.47 88.54 3.81 1.84 6.54 12.03
P1 (160,40) (69,24) 94.12 93.88 7.59 1.78 6.27 10.41
P4 (160,37) (69,17) 93.65 94.92 15.55 1.67 5.78 9.96
P7 (160,37) (69,17) 93.65 95.05 11.43 1.65 6.02 10.35
W1 (10,36) (20,3) 99.25 99.48 60.78 1.20 4.13 10.07
W4 (10,36) (20,6) 99.25 99.74 41.91 1.15 4.03 9.67
C1 (250,38) (66,15) 92.10 90.76 3.72 1.82 6.54 12.03
Table 4. Summary table for optimal configurations, detection rate, sequential overhead overhead and scalability factors for
udp of 20 and coverage 90%
7.2 Analysis of the Overhead Cost Function
Because FPDetect’s detection strategy is sensitive to the specific stencil and the characteristics of the ini-
tial/boundary conditions, we have chosen multiple benchmarks and configurations, including different initial
and mixed boundary conditions. For a broader analysis of the space of choices evaluated in the offline phase, we
examine four candidate benchmarks—h1, c1, w1, and p1–in detail.
Variation of essential and protected widths: Figure 12 shows the variation in optimal Pw volume with input
exponent range. W1, a second-order wave equation representing hyperbolic PDEs, exhibits the highest overhead
and cost since its Pw volume rapidly diminishes with increasing exponent sizes. Benchmarks h1 and c1 exhibit a
slower change in the optimal Pw .
Figure 19 plots the ratio of Ew to Pw for their optimal configuration with varying input exponent range for a
fixed udp and cov. Larger binade differences in the input values result in increasing separation between the Ew
and Pw values, often increasing the Ew to Pw ratio. Together with ρ(equation (12)) this can potentially lead to an
increase in detector overhead.
Impact of input range and udp: Figure 18 shows the cost function values for four benchmarks (h1, c1, p1 and
w1) for hypothetical range of input values from 20 to 29 and user-defined precision of 20 bits. We observe that
cost increases with input range, especially for w1. Thus, accurate yet efficient evaluation of the input range can
help reduce the detector overheads.
Figure 16 shows the evaluated cost function value as udp is varied. Similar to the input exponent range, we
observe that some benchmarks (especially w1) are more sensitive than others to increase in udp. Thus, careful
choice of udp can maximize coverage while minimizing overhead.
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8 ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK
Floating-point error analysis was the central driving concept in our work. Boldo [5, 6], Darulova [14], Magron [34],
and Solovyev [43] are three recent pieces of work that conduct rigorous error analysis. Zhang [55] uses reduced
precision check to detect errors in the floating point units as a hardware solution. Daumas et al. reason about
floating-point operations using interval arithmetic [15]. These tools focus on programs operating on fixed and
small number of inputs. They are unable to handle the kinds of complexity presented by stencil expressions
unfolded in time. They also do not steer their analysis toward the synthesis of online error detectors like in this
work.
We exploit the structure of stencil operations to simplify analysis of parametrically sized programs. Kramer
established worst-case bounds for interval arithmetic [32]. We build on the guarantees for individual operations
(IEEE 754 [30]) to analyze worst-case bounds for stencil programs.
Chisel [35] and Rely [10] consider potentially erroneous execution of portions of a program by analyzing
the probability of the output being erroneous. They track the probability of an erroneous output rather than
its magnitude. Soft error analysis has been performed for specific algorithm classes (e.g., linear algebra [52, 53]
and iterative solvers [20, 48]). Huang and Abraham introduced algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) [28] to
detect errors in matrix multiplication related operations. Elliott et al. [19] present selective reliability to provide
numerical bounds on anticipated behavior and use this analysis in the design of resilient algorithms [18, 21].
Our work focuses on soft error detection for stencil programs. Application-independent approaches for iterative
programs rely on observing the evolution of a value over time to detect anomalies (e.g., AID [17] uses curve fitting,
SSD [45] uses support vector machines (SVM) regression, [41] uses a machine learning based approach to build
regression models for synthesizing low cost detectors). Gomez and Capello exploits multivariate interpolation in
order to detect and correct corruption in stencil application [25]. Xiaoguang [54] presents a grid sampling based
DMR scheme which determines the sampling points based on the error propagation pattern in the grid.
Gamell considers local recovery from fail-stop errors affecting stencil programs [23]. Fang et al. [22] analytically
model application overhead of recovery from detected soft errors via localized recovery. Our approach can
complement such recovery algorithms via efficient error detection.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present FPDetect, an approach to provide error detection that covers both logical bugs and
soft errors in the data space of stencil computations. Schemes comparable to FPDetect have been observed to
generate false positives, incur higher overheads, or not provide similar rigorous guarantees. We report FPDetect’s
overheads for different thread counts as well as its performance in conjunction with polyhedral optimizations
of the code over for various user-defined precision values. We believe that FPDetect can be used as part of a
holistic error detection system (e.g., involving cross-layer concerns [11]) in which the most impactful of errors
affecting stencil programs can be protected.
As future work, we will investigate the use of FPDetect for runtime precision profiling, given that developers
often use high precision as a safety net for floating point errors, which may be wasteful in many cases. FPDetect’s
evaluation units are uniquely designed to allow it to serve as a very close proxy to real values at runtime. Thus it
can help profile runtime precision requirements. In addition to re-instating confidence in the evolving results, this
approach may enable the user to dynamically tune the working precision based on the stability of the evolving
results. To this end, we have prototyped a machine learning model built on profiled simulation data that attempts
to predict the minimum precision around a rectangular region centered around a point for which FPDetect’s
evaluation unit was instantiated. Current results show encouraging trends with prediction accuracies within 2
precision bits. Some of our ongoing work aims to leverage this information in tuning simulation parameters for
improved performance.
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In this material we provide the detailed proof discussions and the analytical choices made in our tool design.
We have highlighted the key results from our work inside the main paper, and present the complete derivation
of the concepts here for completeness. The interested reader is encouraged to have a detailed look into the
derivations.
We discuss broadly the four major sections. In Error Analysis we detail the complete derivation of our affine
arithmetic based round-off error analysis to obtain the detector precision. Precision Driven Optimizations describes
the methodology behind obtaining the Essential Width and Protected Width. Overall Algorithm provides the
exact algorithms used for the offline/online split phases. In software Bug Detection provide examples of the types
of bugs introduced and summary of the Pluto generated code and it’s results.
A ERROR ANALYSIS
A.1 Floating point basics
A floating point number system corresponding to a certain radix is a subset of the set of real numbers, and can be
expressed as a 5 tuple (β , s,m, e,p). Here β is the radix or the base of the floating point system. Our work concern
with β = 2, that is the binary floating point system in double precision with p = 53. s ∈ {−1, 1} is the sign bit,m
is called the significand or mantissa and e is the exponent. There are two types of floating point numbers, the
normal and the denormals, other than the special cases of NANs and infinities. For the normal numbersm lies in
the range 1 ≤ m < 2, while for denormals the range is 0 ≤ m ≤ 1 . The denormal range begins after the lowest
normal number to make a gradual transition towards zero. e is the exponent in the range −1022 ≤ e ≤ 1023. Any
such number xf belonging to the floating point system F has the value s ·m · 2e . If x ∈ R, then xf ∈ F denotes
an element in F closest to x obtained by applying the rounding operator (◦) to x .
IEEE754 [1] defines four rounding modes for elementary floating point operations namely rounding towards
positive infinity (◦+∞), towards negative infinity (◦−∞), towards zero (◦0) and to the nearest (◦∽). Every real
number x lying in the range of F can be approximated by an element xf ∈ F with a relative error no larger
than the unit round-off u = 12β
1−p . Here β1−p corresponds to the unit of least precision (ulp) for exponent value
of 1. We use µ to denote ulp (1), such that µ = 2u. In our case u = 2−53, and hence µ = 2−52. Hence, for all
◦ ∈ {◦+∞, ◦−∞, ◦0, ◦∽}, we have the following result
Theorem A.1. If x ∈ R lies in the range of F, then
◦ (x) = x(1 + δ ), |δ | ≤ u = µ/2 (1)
Given two exactly represented floating point numbers xf and yf , arithmetic operators ⋄ ∈ {+,−,×} have the
following guarantees across for any rounding modes
xf ⋄f yf = (xf ⋄yf )(1 + δ ), |δ | ≤ 2u = µ (2)
Thus the computed floating point value post rounding represents an interval [xf ⋄yf ± |xf ⋄yf |2u] of real
numbers, any of which could have produced the computed value. Multiplication operators have a stricter bound
of |δ | ≤ u
A.2 Affine Analysis
In Affine Arithmetica (AA) [5], a computed quantity (xˆ) is expressed in an affine form over its true value and its
accumulated error quantities as shown in equation (3).
xˆ = x0 +
n∑
i=1
xiϵi (3)
Here, x0 is the central value tracking the true value of xˆ . The coefficients xi are finite floating point numbers
and the ϵi are formal noise variables which are unknown until concretized but assumed to lie in the interval
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[−1,+1]. To interprete an affine variable using an equivalent interval notation, the noise variables are concretized
to their maximum range obtaining the interval Ix .
Ix = [x0 − rad(xˆ),x0 + rad(xˆ)]; rad(xˆ) =
n∑
i=1
|xi | (4)
The real advantage of AA can be seen by deferring the concretization process as far down the computation depth
as possible since once concretized, it looses any variable correlation that might be present. Before concretizing,
incoming contributions from the same or related noise variables are superposed, hence they can accumulate or
cancel based on the sign of the coefficients xi . For example, when evaluating (x − x), affine arithmetic yields 0,
unlike interval analysis where it doubles the interval.
A.3 Arithmetic Operations Using Affine Arithmetic
We define the following three operators to deal with retrieval of noise variables and its coefficients.
• σ : Defines the mapping from an affine variable to its set of noise variables. Thus σ (xˆ) = {ϵi }ni=1.
• σ (0): A special σ to retrieve freshly generated noise variables at the last stage of compute of xˆ . Its purpose is
to distinguish between freshly generated noise variables versus the existing ones.
• γ :Defines the mapping from a 2-tuple of (affine variable, noise variable) to its corresponding noise coefficient.
Thus
γ (xˆ , ϵi ) =
{
xi ; ϵi ∈ σ (xˆ)
0; otherwise
Based on the definitions for σ and γ , we now define the two affine variables xˆ and yˆ as
xˆ = x0 +
∑
ϵi ∈σ (xˆ )
γ (xˆ , ϵi )ϵi ; yˆ = y0 +
∑
ϵi ∈σ (yˆ)
γ (yˆ, ϵi )ϵi (5)
We consider only, (a) a scalar multiplication and (b ) an affine addition for dealing with dot products pertinent
to stencil computations.
Scalar Multiplication. Let α denote an exactly represented scalar quantity, then
αxˆ = αx0 +
∑
ϵi ∈σ (xˆ )
αγ (xˆ , ϵi )ϵi (6)
Affine Addition. The coefficients of the common noise variables are linearly superposed preserving their
correlation, hence coefficients of a common noise variable of equal but opposing sign can cancel out eliminating
that noise variable.
xˆ + yˆ = (x0 +
∑
ϵi ∈σ (xˆ )
γ (xˆ , ϵi )ϵi ) + (y0 +
∑
ϵi ∈σ (yˆ)
γ (yˆ, ϵi )ϵi )
= (x0 + y0) +
∑
ϵi ∈
σ (xˆ )∪σ (yˆ)
(γ (xˆ , ϵi ) + γ (yˆ, ϵi ))ϵi + {higher order terms} (7)
Note that the xi coefficients obtained using γ are finite floating point numbers. Hence during the scaling or
superposition operations they incur rounding error as well leading to higher order rounding terms.
A.4 Affine model for Floating Point
Equation (1) shows the relation between a real number x ∈ R and its rounded floating point representation,
xf = ◦(x) ∈ F. We can represent the floating point variable by associating the uncertainty radius with a noise
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variable as shown in equation (8)
xf = ◦(x) = x(1 + δ ); |δ | ≤ u
= x + (xu)ϵ ; ϵ ∈ [−1,+1] (8)
Let xf and yf be two floating point variables represented as in equation (5) such that xf = xˆ and yf = yˆ.
Instead of the central values being x0 and y0, we replace them by the real number x and y respectively as per the
defintion of our model .
xf = x +
∑
ϵi ∈σ (xˆ )
γ (xˆ , ϵi )ϵi ; yf = y +
∑
ϵi ∈σ (yˆ)
γ (yˆ, ϵi )ϵi (9)
Also, let α and β be two exactly represented scalar quantities as before. In this model every floating point
operation, ⋄f ∈ {◦(+), ◦(−), ◦(×)} introduces a fresh noise variable with coefficients equal to the uncertainty of
maximum round-off error introduced by that operation as in (2). We consider two operations specific to the
stencil inner product: (1) scaling xf by an exactly represented scalar α shown in (10), and (2) add or subtract two
error-laden FP numbers xf and yf as shown in (11)
◦(α×xf ) =
(
αx+
∑
ϵi ∈σ (xf )
αγ (xf , ϵi )ϵi
)
+((αx)µ)ϵnew+{he} (10)
◦(xf +yf ) = (x + y) +
∑
ϵi ∈σ (xf )∪σ (yf )
{γ (xf , ϵi ) + γ (yf , ϵi )}ϵi
+ ((x +y)µ)ϵnew + {he}
(11)
Observations from equation (10) and (11)
• A new formal noise variable gets introduced, denoted here as ϵnew for every new floating point operation.
• Furthermore, the α scaling operations in (10) or the linear superposition of the coefficients in (11) over
the set of union of the noise variables show how the error from previous stages get propagated to future
computations. However, these operations are also to be performed in finite precision and hence introduces
second order noise variable which we have bracketed out as higher order error terms. We choose to ignore
second and higher order error terms(that is u2 or higher) since they do not substantially affect the analysis
until the problem size approaches 253. Considering higher order noise variables leads to an explosion of
new noise variables being produced while not adding significant benefit to the accuracy analysis of the
system, we ignore the second order terms.
• If ϵi ∈ σ (xf )∩σ (yf ), then in the linear superposition considering the affinemodel we get (γ (xf , ϵi )+γ (yf , ϵi ))
while when using interval analysis would result in (|γ (xf , ϵi )| + |γ (yf , ϵi )|) which would have been a large
over-approximation when there is a mix of addition and cancellation terms.
Generation and Propagation of Errors: Darulova [4] introduces the notion of separating the generation and
propagation of errors. This helps to analyze the effect of each individual formal noise variable separately instead
of over-approximating all error terms together as done in interval analysis. We extend its application to stencil
codes. Consider a real function f and its floating point version f˜ . The real set of variables is denoted by x while
the rounded off variable set(with error laden terms intrinsically) are denoted as x˜. Then the total error can be
written and decomposed in the form
| f (x) − f˜ (x˜)| ≤
propagation of errors︷          ︸︸          ︷
| f (x) − f (x˜)| +
Freshly generated errors︷          ︸︸          ︷
| f (x˜) − f˜ (x˜)|
(12)
The first term essentially represents the contribution of the initial error in the input to the output. Thus each
input variable associates with itself a propagation factor by which error on the input gets propagated to the
output. The propagation factor essentially characterizes the rate at which the output changes for some delta
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change in the input. Here the delta change in the input is the round-off term associated with the error laden
input variable. Thus the propagation factor essentially depends on the derivative of the function with respect to
the input points.
Let Ki denote the propagation factor for variable xi and σ (xi ) denotes the set of noise variables existing at xi
as part of incoming error. Then
| f (x) − f (x˜)| ≤
m∑
i=1
Ki
( ∑
ϵi ∈σ (xi )
γ (xi , ϵi )ϵi
)
; where, Ki = sup
wi ∈ x˜
 ∂ f∂wi
 (13)
Evaluating Ki factors is easy to visualize once the computational graph is available as shown in Figure 1.
As a simple ilustration, consider a single step iteration of a 1-d 3-point stencil with stencil coefficients {c1, c2, c3}
centered around x2 to evaluate x2 for the next time step, denoted here as S in Figure 1. Thus the computational
graph evaluates S = ((c1 × x1) + (c2 × x2)) + (c3 × x3). If ϵ ′ is a noise variable belonging to σ (x1) , then the error
contribution’s propagation at S will be
γ (x1, ϵ ′) · Kx1 = γ (x1, ϵ ′) ·
 dSdx1
 = γ (x1, ϵ ′) · dSdS · dSdq · dqdz1 · dz1dx1

= γ (x1, ϵ ′) · 1 · 1 · 1 · c1 = γ (x1, ϵ ′) · c1
(14)
Thus for all such ϵ ′ ∈ σ (x1), the γ (xi , ϵ ′) gets propagated by c1. Similarly for x2 and x3.
Fig. 1. Computational graph with highlighted derivatives for 1 step of a 1-d 3-point stencil
A.5 Modeling rounding error in Stencils
Stencil applications modeling real world partial differential equations in fluids, combustion, cosmology and
other computing areas are required to deal with multiple physical quantities. For example, when modeling
electromagnetic fields with finite difference time domain methods, there are atleast two arrays corresponding
to the electric and magnetic field whose updates are intrinsically dependent on both arrays. To address more
complicated structures, we introduce the notion of multiple array updates. Suppose, every contribution depends
on contributions from N participating arrays. We denote the iterative stencil update rule by f ms which associates
the stencil update function to the domain of grid points, ®x , and the array being updated. Equation (15) shows the
single step update rule for updating location Au [®x ,t],that is location ®x of array Au for time step t
f 1s (®x , t ,Au ) =
N∑
v=1
®w∑
®i=− ®w
c(u,v,®i,1) ×Av [®x + ®i, t − 1] (15)
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where, c(u,v,®i,1) denotes the contributing coefficient from array Av to array Au from the location at an offset ®i
from ®x over a single step. The iterator ®i loops over the stencil-width ®w in the neighborhood of the point. If we
unroll f 1s over k iterations symbolically and reassociate the coefficients, we obtain a real-space equivalent (=r eal )
update rule to compute directly over k iterations. We define the direct update rule by f kd as:
f kd (®x , t ,Au ) =
N∑
v=1
k ®w∑
®i=−k ®w
c(u,v,®i,k ) ×Av [®x + ®i, t − k] (16)
such that Au [®x ,t] =r eal f kd (®x , t ,Au ). Note that as we unroll over k steps, the stencil width proportionally
extends over k ®w neighborhood of the location ®x .
We use the multi-step update rule as our alternative evaluation strategy for a detector located at a pointAu [®x ,t0+T ]
using values from a baseline at t = t0 as modeled by f Td (®x , t0 +T ,Au ) and refer to it as direct evaluation. First,
we determine the effective path contribution from each point on the baseline t=t0 towards Au [®x ,t0+T ] that fall
inside its dependence cone and then perform a dot-product of these coefficients with the corresponding data
points from the baseline.
Fig. 2. Error propagation from point (x-1,t0+t’) to (x,t0+T) (1-d stencil)
Figure 2 shows the dependence cone and the data value flow paths when evaluating a stencil point at (t0+T , ®x)
from a baseline at t=t0 for a single array 1-d 3-point stencil. Evaluation of each node of this stencil comprise
of three multiplications and two additions, same as the computational flow graph shown in fig 1. In total five
operations per node results in 5 fresh noise variable generated per node. Thus the space complexity is linear
in the number of data points. For a d-dimensional problem with N-arrays and T-step detector model, the space
complexity for the noise variables will be O (NT d ). For notation ,we always consider the update towards array
Au , but the same holds for all participating arrays. Consider a point ®P located within the dependence cone, t ′
steps in the future from the baseline and equivalently (T − t ′) in the past from the point (t0 +T , ®x). The value at
®P is obtained after executing the iterative stencil over t ′ steps, that is f t ′s ( ®P , t0 + t ′,Au ). σ (Au [ ®P ,t0+T ]) denotes
the set of noise variables at ®P for array Au . It comprises of the set of incoming noise variables already generated
(propagation of errors) before reaching the stage of evaluation of f 1s ( ®P , t0+t ′−1,Au ) and the new noise variables
generated due to round-off from its execution.
Thus, we have
σ (Au [ ®P ,t0+t ′]) =
propagation of incoming errors generated before t + t ′︷                                ︸︸                                ︷
N⋃
v=1
{ ®w⋃
®i=− ®w
σ (Av [ ®P+®i,t0+t ′−1]
}
∪ σ (0)(Au [ ®P , t0 + t ′])︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
freshly generated errors at t + t ′
(17)
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In equation (17) , the first term on the rhs indicate the propagation of existing errors before reaching the
compute stage of ®P . The second term of the union retrieves the freshly generated noise variables at ®P using the
operator σ (0).
Once a noise variable is freshly generated at ®P , its magnitude is scaled by the effective path contribution from
®P to the destination Au [®x ,t0+T ] which in the derivative form can be summarized as dAu [®x ,t0+T ]
dAv [ ®P , t0 + t ′]
 = c(u,v, ®x− ®P,T−t ′) (18)
depending on which participating array ®P belongs to for a multi-array update. Thus, instead of dynamically
propagating the noise variables at every step, we associate a set of fresh noise variables with each compute node
of the CFG, and then scale them directly with the pre-computed coefficients of equation (18). For an intermediate
time tile at t = t0 + t ′, let Et
′
u,v denote the total error contribution for the new noise variables at (t0 + t ′) due to
Av contributing towards Au . Then we have
Et
′
u,v=
®w (T−t ′)∑
i=
− ®w (T−t ′)
( ∑
ϵi ∈
σ (0)
(
®P(t ′, ®i )
)

noise coefficient︷       ︸︸       ︷
γ ( ®P(t ′,®i), ϵi ) × c(u,v,®i,T−t ′)︸       ︷︷       ︸
Propagating coefficient
) (19)
where, ®P(t ′,®i) = Av [®x + ®i, t0 + t ′]. Et
′
u,v needs to be summed over all the participating arrays that contribute to Au
to obtain the total error term at t0 + t ′. To find the total error generated over T steps, we need to sum for all the
intermediate t ′ tiles. Then the total error (TE ) and the relative error (RE ) in the evaluation of Au [®x ,t0+T ] are:
TE (Au [®x , t0 +T ]) =
T∑
t ′=0
(
N∑
v=1
Et
′
u,v
)
RE (Au [®x , t0 +T ]) =
 TE (Au [®x , t0 +T ]f Td (®x , t0 +T ,Au )
 (20)
The relative error measure normalizes the total error by the actual stencil value at that point(ideally the exact
real value) hence providing a quantification about how severe the encountered loss is with repect to the actual
operating data. Note that when normalizing, the denomiator used detector evaluation, f Td , and not the stencil’s
iterated value. In theory, we must normalize by the ideal real value but in practice we have to compute in finite
precision. However, our direct evaluation is designed to be a very close proxy to real evaluation since parts of it
can be exercised at very high precision.
Iterated vs direct loss. Evaluating equation (20) for all (®x + ®i, t0) belonging to a bounded input interval [Il , Iu ]
derives the relative error for the iterated evaluation of the stencil denoted by Rs . To evaluate the error loss for
the direct evaluation, we start from (®x , t0 +T ) and do a back propagation to compute the coefficient set for f Td ,
followed by a f Td evaluation on the input data set bounded in the interval [Il , Iu ]. Since, f Td computes a large
dot product that can introduce significant round off error, we deploy Kahan’s algorithm [6] for the additive
portion of f Td , which is computationally more expensive but more precision-preserving summation algorithm.
Let the relative error term evaluated for the direct evaluation be Rd . The precision of value computed using direct
evaluation need not be any greater than that produced by the iterative stencil.
bits preservedT = (dp)T = p − log2(max(Rs ,Rd )) (21)
Equation (21) evaluates the minimum matching precision between the iterated and direct evaluation schemes
over T-steps that survives the loss due to round-off error. This is denoted by detector precision (dp), and
represents the maximum precision that can potentially be guaranteed by our detection strategy. Note that our
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error analysis is conservative in its treatment of input values, and might not capture the maximum precision
preserved by a specific set of input values. On the other hand, it provides a rigorous detection guarantee and
attempts to minimize total cost in providing that guarantee.
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B PRECISION DRIVEN OPTIMIZATIONS
In the main paper we discuss the precision driven optimization techniques employed to reduce the detector
computation cost while still guaranteeing the necessary quality detection. The concepts of Essential Width and
Protected Width were introduced briefly with discussions on how they help the optimization process. Here, we
delve into further details of these concepts begining with an intuitive description followed by formalization of
the concepts.
B.1 Overview
To simplify the intricacies of the methodologies of FPDetect , we begin with a simple one dimensionsal heat
equaation description represented in the continuous domain as
∂u
∂t
= ∇2u(x), x ∈ Ω × (0,T ]
u(x) = uD , x ∈ ∂Ω × (0,T ] (Dirichlet Boundary Conditions)
u = u0(x), t = 0 ; (Initial Conditions)
(22)
where u(x) corresponds to the exact solution, Ω is the solution domain and ∂Ω corresponds to the boundary
points of the domain. An explicit finite difference solution of (22) is expressed as
un+1i = α
∆t
∆x
uni−1 + (1 − 2α
∆t
∆x
)uni + α
∆t
∆x
uni+1 (23)
Here uni is corresponds to the i ′th discretized point during the time iteration n. Thus neighbouring points from
the n′th iteration are used to update a point during its next iteration. The correct choice of the discretization
parameters constitute the amount of contribution received from the neighbouring elements in the evolution of a
stencil. We consider the following coefficients only for demonstrating the methodologies. Let A denote the one
dimensional grid on which u(x) is discretized into (N+1) points including the boundaries. With a set of chosen
coefficients conforming to the discretization and stability criterions, a common 1d heat equation form is written
as
A[x , t + 1] = 0.25 ∗A[x − 1, t] + 0.5 ∗A[x , t] + 0.25 ∗A[x + 1, t] (24)
On the rhs of (24) one can further expand by replacing them using points from step (t − 1) and so on. Notice
that the offset dependence around i for one iteration in this case is {−1, 0,+1}, while when unrolled for 2 steps it
will be {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} and so on. Let Setk denote the offset set corresponding to the k ′th unroll. For our example,
if we unroll this way, we can see the evolution pattern in the corresponding coefficients as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Evolution of Coefficient values as we unroll the stencil
Set Number Coefficients at Offsets
offset index→ -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Set1 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0
Set2 0 0.0625 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.0625 0
Set3 0.015625 0.09375 0.234375 0.3125 0.234375 0.09375 0.015625
While our direct evaluation method by leap-frogging Tsteps is equivalent in the real space, it is still subject to
round off error accumulation due to the non compositional nature of floating point numbers. FPDetect tries to find
the upper bound on the minimum matching precision between the stencil and the direct evaluation executions
for a given interval range. using the methods described in section A.5. We call this the detector precision (dpT ).
Given we obtain this bound on the precision to check at the detector, it opens up the possibility of driving
optimizations constrained by dpT . The Setk values show that as we increase k , the set of points required in
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Fig. 3. Simplified 1D stencil over 6 time
steps Fig. 4. Illustration of path dominance Fig. 5. Essential (Ew ) and protected
widths (Pw )
the offset to compute the detector increases. Furthermore, the points at the edges of these dependence sets
have reduced contributions to the compute than the interior points. This is due to a combination of associated
primary coefficients due to the discretization process and the phenomenon of path dominance. We do not consider
discretization effects and assume the discretized numerics are designed to be stable inlcuding the method error.
However, we consider the effect of path dominance as shown in fig 4 by the highlighted path contribution.
Essentially, points at the boundary of the cone have lesser path contributions than the interior ones. Notice
that when computing in infinite precision we require computing over the entire dependence set to obtain the
exact real value. However in finite precision, we have already trimmed our expectation of the preserved accuracy
at the detector location by dpT . For example, when computing in double precision with p = 53 bits, FPDetect
says a detector precision of 45 bits can be matched between the stencil and the detector over 64 iterations for
the one dimensional heat example. Hence, points in the dependence set that do not possess sufficiently strong
contributing coefficients to affect the detector within 45 bits are good candidates to be trimmed away from
the detector’s dependence set for the evaluation. Thus, instead of the offset being {−64,−63, . . . , 0, . . . , 63, 64}
will become say {−40,−39, . . . , 0, . . . , 39, 40} based on the analysis presented later. We carve out an essential
width (Ew ) out of the full dependence set. This process introduces controlled approximations to the detector
compute process while still retaining the detector precision bound. Fig 5 shows a representative Ew for a detector.
Furthermore, each point in a detectors dependence cone, contribute to the detector a varying amount of
precision. We provide the user with a parametric knob called the user defined precision (udp) that lets the
user choose how many bits they want to be preserved for fractions of the computation space. For example,
suppose the user selects udp = 20 bits. In our example, with dp64 = 45 at the detector, FPDetect finds theminimal
set of points which contribute atleast 20 bits of precision to reatin 45 bits of precision at the detector.
Thus any mismatch beyond dp64 at the detector implies atleast one or more of the points in this minimal set of
points been affected. This forms the basis of FPDetect ’s protection mechanism and this minimal set of points
conforming to the udp protection guarantee is called Protected Width Pw . Fig 5 shows a representative Pw tile
for the given detector. Next we discuss how the Ew and Pw are obtained by detailing the interactions between
operating floating point numbers.
B.2 Precision reasoning on operand exponents
In section ??, we denote a floating point number as a 5-tuple (β, s,m, e,p). For a given radix,β (= 2) and a
fixed working precision p(= 53) we can represent a number in this system using the 3-tuple of (s,m, e). Let
a = (sa ,ma , ea) and b = (sb ,mb , eb ) be two such floating point numbers under a fixed β and p floating point
system. We define a distance metric (d), that quantifies the relative distance of the binades 1 in which the two
floating point numbers are represented.
dab = |ea − eb | (25)
1A binade is a set of binary floating-point values that all have the same sign and exponent. The distance between successive members
belonging to the same binade are equal to the ulp of that binade
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Let Sab denote the summation of these two floating point numbers
Sab = ◦(a + b) = ◦((sa ,ma , ea) + (sb ,mb , eb ))
For floating point addition/subtraction, the two operands are adjusted to bring them in the same binade and
then binary addition/subtraction takes effect between the mantissa components followed by rounding. If ea > eb ,
then to evaluate Sab ,mb must be shifted by dab bits to its lsb implying dab bits ofmb are lost. In other words, in
the system with working precision p, only (p − dab ) bits ofmb take part in the binary addition to determine the
final outcome of Sab . Likewise, if eb > ea , thenma shifts by dab bits towards its lsb.
B.3 Modeling Protected Width (Pw )
Suppose a and b, instead of being two floating point numbers, belongs to an interval such that
a ∈ [al ,au ]; b ∈ [bl ,bu ]
where the subscripts l and u denote the lower and upper bounds respectively. We can further break down the
floating point representations of the intervals bounds in terms of the 3-tuple expressions as
[al ,au ] = [(sa ,ma , ea), (sa ,ma , ea)]; [bl ,bu ] = [(sb ,mb , eb ), (sb ,mb , eb )];
To quantify theminimal possible influence a has on the summation Sab , we need to find the distance of
the exponents between the maxima of b and the minima of a. Hence, theminimal number of precision bits
(Pa ) of a that part take in the summation for the resulting p precision bits can be quantified as in equation (26)
where p is the working precision of the system.
Pa =
{
p − (eb − ea) : (eb − ea) > 0
p : (eb − ea) ≤ 0
Pa = p −max(0, (eb − ea))
(26)
Similarly, we can quantify theminimal possible influence b has on the Sab as
Pb = p −max(0, (ea − eb )) (27)
We will next show how to extend the analysis from two points to a set of points. FPDetect works by synthesizing
detectors for the expected ranges of binades that the stencil computation may begin with. A T − step detector’s
support comprises of (2 ∗ T ∗ ®w + 1) points centered around a grid location ®x , that is the points in the set
XD = [®x − ®wT , ®x + ®wT ], where ®w represents the footprint of one iteration of the stencil expressed as a vector to
include higher dimensional spaces. Each point xi in XD belongs to the tighest encompassing interval I . Upon
multiplying each xi by their respective T − step coefficients, ci , generates separate intervals for each individual
product term denotes as
[yi ,yi ] = [min(cixi , cixi ),max(cixi , cixi )]
This results in a new set of N points, Y = [y1,y2, . . . ,yN ], where N = (2T ®w + 1). Thus , we are now extending
our precision enfluence analysis from two points to a larger set of N points each belonging to separate intervals.
Let SY denote the summation of the points in Y over the respective intervalss, then
SY =
N∑
j=1
yj =
N∑
j=1
[yj ,yj ]
= [SY , SY ]
(28)
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To analyze the minimal contribution of point yi , we need to compare its contribution with respect to the
maximal contribution from all the remaining points over that interval. Let SY \i denote the partial sum over all
points in Y excluding yi .
SY \i =
N∑
j=1
i,j
yj
= [SY \i , SY \i ]
(29)
We redefine the distance metric from equation (25) corresponding to pointyi as dmax(yi ) to be distance between
the exponent of the upper bound of SY \i and the exponent of the lower bound of yi such that
dmax(yi ) = max(0, exp((SY \i ) − exp(yi ))) (30)
Then the minimal precision contribution of point yi to the final sum, SY , is computed upto p precision bits will
be expressed as
minContribp (yi , SY ) = p − dmax(yi )
Our bound of correctness of p precision bits holds upto the detector precision, dpT , for the error analysis of a
T-step model of the detector. Hence, we have
minContribdpT (yi , SY ) = dpT − dmax(yi ) (31)
Equation (31) evaluates the minimal precision of each point in Y that affects SY within dpT bits of precision.
This now enables us to partition the set Y based on a user defined precision(udp) that the user selects for
protection guarantees. Let Yudp denote the set of points in Y whose contribution to SY is atleast udp precision.
We can define such a set as
Yudp = [yi :minContribdpT (yi , SY ) ≥ udp, yi ∈ Y ] (32)
The most significant udp bits of precision of each point inside Yudp is then protected if SY is evaluated correctly
to dpT bits of precision. The set Yudp forms the building block for obtaining the the Protected Width (Pw )
parameter.
In our stencil model, for a detector placed at Au [®x , t0 +T ], we define Protected Width (Pw (T , ρ,udp)) as the
width of the multidimensional rectangular region centerd around ®x such that with respect to a detector placed at
time t0 +T and spatial position ®x , for each ®p ∈ ®x ± Pw (T , ρ,udp) at time t0 + ρ, the protection guarantee holds.
Lemma B.1. An error affecting any of the MSB udp bits of a point inside the protected width is detected.
For a point yi in Y , if yi belongs to Yudp and its minimal precision contribution is pi at the final output,
then pi ≥ udp. If yi ∈ [yi ,yi ], then an error, erryi affecting within the MSB udp bits will be bounded by
erryi ≥ 2exp(yi )−pi+1. Since, we are matching dp bits at the detector, hence the threshold of detectable error is
bounded by 2exp(SY )−dpT +1. For our guarantee to hold, the following must be true
generated error ≥ error threshold
2exp(yi )−pi+1 ≥ 2exp(SY )−dpT +1 (33)
Taking logarithms and simplifying the above terms leads to the following relation that must hold true for all
points inside the Pw region.
exp(SY ) − exp(yi ) ≤ dpT − pi
udp ≤ pi ≤ dpT − {exp(SY ) − exp(yi )}
(34)
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In figure 5 , the enclosed region (ρ × Pw ) for the given detector location T-steps ahead forms the protected
region for that detector. In determining the protected region, where a detector is used to protect iteration points
in multiple time steps, we choose ρ such that the protected width chosen at ρ is also valid for all time points
t0 ≤ t ≤ t0 + ρ:
∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ ρ : Pw (T , ρ,udp) ≤ Pw (T , t ,udp) (35)
B.4 Modeling Essential Width (Ew )
Essential width models the maximum set of points in X absolutely necessary to obtain dpT precision at the
detector location. If the maximal contribution of yi to the output falls below ulp of the desired precision, then yi
can be safely discarded. Ofcourse, all discarded points collectively could still affect within the required precision.
Hence, there is an iterative process to carve out a set of excluded points. To this end, we compare y ′is maxi-
mal contribution with respect to the minimal contribution from all the remaining points. We define dmin(yi ) as
the distance between the exponent of the lower bound of SY \i and the exponent of the upper bound foryi such that
dmin(yi ) = max(0, exp(S iY ) − exp(yi )) (36)
The maximal precision contribution of point yi to the final sum SY when SY is computed up to p precision bits is
maxContribp (yi , SY ) = p − dmin(yi ) (37)
In our stencil model for detector placed at Au [®x , t0 +T ], we define Essential Width (Ew ) as the width of the
multidimensional rectangular region around ®x such that the direct evaluation over Ew is sufficient to guarantee
dpT precision at the detector. Specifically, the region is defined by extents Ewl and Ewr such that Ew = Ewl+Ewr +1.
Figure 5 illustrates Ew for evaluation of a 1-D stencil over T-steps.
Lemma B.2. In the absence of an error, direct evaluation over the essential width (Ew ) ensures the correctness of
the computation to at least dpT bits of precision at the detector location.
For all points in the region excluded from Ew ∀X˜ : X˜ ⊂ ([®x ± ®wT ] − Ew ), the following holds
∀xi ∈ X˜ :maxContribdpT
(∑
(yi = ci × xi ), SY
)
≤ 0 (38)
One form of false positives involves detection of soft errors when no error affects any iteration point on which
the detector depends (aka the detector’s dependence cone). The preceding lemma guarantees that, despite the
reduced evaluation cost, in the absence of errors affecting the dependence code, the direct evaluation is equivalent
to the iterative evaluation within dp bits and no soft error notification(false alarms) is triggered.
In essence, Essential Width (Ew ) provides a method to reduce the detector evaluation cost while retaining the
quality of the detector precision (dpT ). The Protected Width (Pw ) on the other hand characterizes a detectors
maximum reach to provide rigorous protection for an enclosed region of space per detector. Hence, obtaining an
optimal combination of (Ew , Pw , ρ) allows FPDetect to situate detectors sparsely and effectively over the entire
compute space.
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C OVERALL ALGORITHM
To efficiently deploy FPDetect ’s detectors during online execution, we build a look-up table of detector con-
figurations using an offline profiling pass without actually looking at the input data. This allows the detector
configurations to be valid for a large range of initialization and boundary constraints when being instantiated
online. For each anticipated choice ofudp, probability of detection, and anticipated input range, the offline analysis
determines the detector configuration to be used during online execution. A detector configuration consists of:
T , the distance at which the single-direct detector is evaluated: ρ, the number of iterations between certified
baselines: Ew , the essential width to evaluate the detector; Detector coefficients for the values in the essential
width; and Pw , the spatial separation between detectors in the same time step. These parameters completely
specify the detector configuration at runtime.
C.1 Offline algorithm.
We consider all T and ρ such that T ≤ Tmax, ρ < T . To constrain the search space of possible configurations, we
use a customizable upper bound on the Tstep (say, Tmax = 256) that one may use for the detector evaluation.
Furthermore, having a very large T impacts coverage around the boundary region. For a d-dimensional stencil,
Pw is d-dimensional vector, corresponding to protected region of iteration points centered at the detector. Ew is
represented by a rectangular region with a computed number of points along left and right of the detector along
each direction. These extents along dimension i are denoted by ewli and ewri with ewi = ewli + ewri + 1. The
cost function for a 5-tuple detector configuration (exp,udp,T , ρ,Coe f f s) is given as
Cost =
1
ρ
d∏
i=1
(
ewi
pwi
)
(39)
Even though the tuple elements exp, T , and Coe f f s do not explicitly appear in the cost function, they implicitly
influence the cost through Ew and Pw .
1 struct Config {
2 double volume, cost;
3 int dt, ρ , pwvec, ewlvec, ewrvec;
4 };
5 auto offline_analysis(Tmax, exp_set, udp_set, cov_set) {
6 for exp in exp_set:
7 //compute maxdp[t] for 1<=t<=Tmax
8 //compute ewcost[t] as product of elements of vector ew[exp,t,maxdp[t]]
9 for b in udp_set:
10 COV[nt, nt, wvec] = //number of points in region [dt:dt+ρ][−i:i][−j:j] with b bits of coverage
11 for dt = nt−1 .. 0 and ρ = nt−dt .. dt+1:
12 forall ivec:
13 cost = VOLUME(dt, ρ , ivec) / ewcost[dt+ρ]);
14 for c in cov_set:
15 if COV(dt, ρ , ivec) >= c && configs[exp,b,c].cost < cost
16 configs[exp,b,c] = {vol, cost, dt, ρ , ivec, ewl[dt+ρ], ewr[dt+ρ]}
17 return configs;
18 }
Fig. 6. Offline profiler for optimal detector configurations
Figure 6 outlines the steps involved in the offline analysis. The algorithm takes as input parameters for which
offline profiles need to be determined: the maximum number of time steps (Tmax), the set of input ranges (as
exponents in exp_set), set of udp values (as udp_set), and probabilistic coverage values (cov_set). The algorithm
determines the configurations one input range choice at a time. Using floating-point round-off analysis, the
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: May 2020.
FPDetect : Supporting Material • 1:15
maximum number of bits that will be preserved for each possible time step t is computed (as maxdp). For each t ,
the cost of evaluating each detector is computed as the product of the ®ew dimensions to guaranteemaxdp[t] bits
of precision of the direct evaluation t time steps away. Then, for each candidate protected region, the fraction
of points with guaranteed coverage of b bits (where b is a candidate udp in the input parameter udp_set) is
computed. If this fraction is greater than a desired coverage and if the associated cost is lower than that of any
configuration seen thus far, this configuration is chosen. After evaluating all feasible solutions, the algorithm
returns the last chosen configurations.
Algorithm 1 Online Detection
1: function OnlineDetection(A=Stencil,udp , cov )
2: I = ScanInput(A)
3: exp = MapInterval(I)
4: in_cov = AdjustCoverage(cov)
5: {T , ρ, dp, ®Ew , ®Pw } = lookup_configuration[(exp, udp,in_cov)]
6: Coeffs = get_coefficient(Stencil, T, ®Ew )
7: configure_detectors({T , ρ, dp, ®Ew , ®Pw })
8: cur = 0; tδ = T - ρ
9: D[0] = eval_detector(A, Coeffs)
10: execute_stencil(min(ITER, ρ),A)
11: for t = ρ ; t < ITER; t += ρ do
12: cur = 1 − cur
13: D[cur ] = eval_detector(A, Coeffs)
14: execute_stencil(min(ITER-t, tδ ), A)
15: if t + tδ ≤ ITER then
16: detector_check(A, D[1 − cur ])
17: if t + tδ < ITER then
18: execute_stencil(min(ITER-(t + T - ρ), ρ − tδ ))
19: if ITER > ρ and ITER%ρ < tδ then
20: trailing_detector(D[1 − cur ], A)
21: if ITER% ρ != 0 then
22: trailing_detector(D[cur ], A)
C.2 Online Detector-Embedded Execution
Algorithm 1 outlines the online detector-embedded execution of a given stencil kernel. The input values are
scanned to compute the input exponent range to be handled in the floating-point space (lines 2–3). To account
for the unprotected boundary regions, user’s input cov value is mapped to an equivalent internal coverage value
(in_cov) that corresponds to the detection probability on the grid excluding the boundaries. The adjustment is
done with the guarantee that the fraction of points covered due to (in_cov) is at least as many required by cov
over the entire computation space. If an equivalent mapping is not found by (AdjustedCoverage), the program
exits conveying an error message for unsupported coverage. The input range, the user-specified udp, and the
modified detection probability (in_cov) are used to lookup the detector configuration (lines 5–7).
After an initial evaluation of the detector and the stencil for ρ iterations (lines 9–10), the execution of the
stencil (execute_stencil) is split into two segments: iterations till the next detector evaluation (eval_detector
and iterations till the next detector check (detector_check). Thus, the stencil is executed with interleaved
detector evaluation and checking (lines 11–18). Note that the algorithm assumes ρ is greater than half the detector
evaluation T-step. This scenario requires at most two “live”, i.e., unchecked detectors per spatial position in the
iteration space, at any time. If not, at each spatial position, multiple detectors need to be evaluated and retained
until they are checked.
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When all iterations of the stencil have been executed, the iterations past the last certified baseline need to be
checked. To protect any leftover iterations, the computation since the last certified baseline is checked using the
trailing detection strategy (lines 19–22).
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D SOFTWARE BUG DETECTION
FPDetect ’s evaluation units can be efficiently utilized to trap logical and compiler transformation (polyhedral
transforms exploiting data locality and parallelism) induced bugs. The design of these evaluation units model
the actual stencil in real equivalent space and hence are logically equivalent to the actual stencil without any
modeling bias. Thus any transformation bugs introduced into the stencil codes later trhough optimization will
result in mismatch with our evaluation units. Hypothesizing that such bugs lead to systematic errors impacting
floating point values non-trivially, we intend to trap bugs in the floating point space within a precision threshold.
As such, there remains possibility that bugs escape beyond the threshold we check for (controlled by the detector
precision).
Table 2. Summary of Pluto generated code.
Benchmarks SLOC spec SLOC Pluto Num Loops Nesting Level
H1 27 905 374 7
H2 52 1164 370 7
H3 65 905 374 11
H4 54 2314 486 6
H5 54 2314 486 6
H6 54 2314 486 6
P1 23 31 12 6
P2 23 31 12 6
P3 19 31 12 6
P4 63 1163 370 6
P5 39 1163 370 6
P6 39 1163 370 6
P7 47 1165 414 6
P8 47 956 416 6
P9 47 956 416 6
W1 70 1157 360 6
W2 70 1157 360 6
W3 70 1157 360 6
W4 70 1157 360 6
W5 70 1157 360 6
W6 70 1157 360 6
C1 53 1157 360 6
C2 53 1157 360 6
C3 53 1157 360 6
Summary of Pluto generated code: We studied the effectiveness of FPDetect ’s evaluation units in bugs
introduced to evaluate polycheck [2] on Pluto [3] optimized stencil codes. To generate optimized versions using
Pluto, we implemented all the stencils in the form of affine loop nests enclosed in scop pragmas. This code input
to Pluto has consists of median 53 source lines of code (SLOC)2 per benchmark. Pluto takes these scop-annotated
benchmarks as input to generate optimized versions with median 1157 SLOC. The median of the number of loops
in the transformed code was 365 across all the benchmarks with a median nesting depth of 6. In checking such
large and complex generated codes, tools such as FPDetect are essential. Table 2 provides a summary of the Pluto
generated code. The ‘spec’ refers the original stencil code prior to feeding into Pluto. We report the source lines
2Source lines of code are measured using sloccount tool
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of code (SLOC) for both the ‘spec’ and the Pluto optimized version alongwith the number of loops and nesting
levels in the transformed code. The number of loops and nesting levels drive the complexity of the tests being
performed since each ‘for loop’ entry point becomes a potential bug-injection site.
The bugs introduced in the source potentially affect multiple runtime operations making them easier to detect.
These tests fall under three categories based on the generated errors impacting: (1)Loop bounds, resulting in an
incorrect stencil pattern at the tile boundaries, (2)array access, affecting the stencil footprint used, and (3)Loop
reordering, affecting the data dependencies. We discuss each of them with an example as discussed below.
Loop Bounds: To inject errors impacting ‘loop’ bounds, we first identified all the ‘for’ loop sites present in
the transformed code. Error injection was performed by either adding one to a lower bound of a for loop or
subtracting one from an upper bound. This was automated by replacing each bound, x , for an identifed ’for loop’
with a call to a function bound(c,x) where c is a constant integer number identifying each unique callsite and x
is the actual bound in the original ‘for loop’ of the transformed code as shown in figure 7.
1 for (t1=−938)t1<=floord(3∗steps,32);t1++) {
2 for (t2=lbp;t2<=ubp;t2++) {
1 for (t1= bound (0, −938);t1<= bound (1, floord(3∗steps,32));t1++) {
2 for (t2= bound (2, lbp);t2<= bound (3, ubp);t2++) {
Fig. 7. Source code before and after bound replacement
A callsite can be selected by command line argument and the resulting execution will have the indicated bound
changed. The bound function returns the x value (the original bound) if the callsite does not match the selected
callsite for fault injection. IF it is the selected call-site, then it return x + 1 if c is even or x − 1 if c is odd.
Array Access: Similarly the array access errors were injected using a function utilizing a unique integer. Each
‘for’ loop site was replace by the function acs with a unique integer ID as shown in the figure 8. On encountering
an acs function call, it returns the original access value if its unique ID number do not match the intended
injection call site ID. for injection. When it matches, it returns the modiefied the access value by dividing it by
two.
1 A[( ((32∗t1+15056)/3) − 1) % 2][10000][(−32∗t1+3∗t6−15056)/3)]
1 A[ acs (51, ( ((32∗t1+15056)/3) − 1) % 2)][ acs (52, 10000)][ acs (53, ((−32∗t1+3∗t6−15056)/3))]
Fig. 8. Source code before and after access replacement
For both these methods of automatic injection there are three counts that come about. One is the number
of source code locations modified. Another is the number of locations reached by the running code. The final
number is the number of locations reached which actually changed the computation. Not all source locations
where an error can be injected are reachable at run time. Table 3 identifies the source locations (#SL) identified
and the number of runtime locations (#RL) actually reached for injecting a bug. For example, in benchmark H4,
there are 486 locations for injecting a bug that can potentially impact a loop-bound, however only 106 of them
are reached at runtime.
False positives. Some bugs do not result in any difference in our bitwise comparison of the result with the
non-buggy version. Therefore, our approach incurs no false positives in our evaluation. This is because some
source-level bugs do not manifest at runtime. For example, a loop iterator might be constrained by multiple
loop bounds (e.g., min or max of multiple expressions), with the loop bound never reaching the error-injected
expressions.For example, in benchmark H4, there are 486 locations for injecting a bug that can potentially impact
a loop-bound, however only 106 of them are reached at runtime. Figure 9 lists an example where the ‘for’ loop
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iterator passes trhough two nested ‘if’ checks that can potentially mask an error in the iterator due to a bug
impacting the ‘for loop’ bound value.
1 for (t1=−938; t1<value; t1++) {
2 if (2∗t1%3 == 0) {
3 if ((t1+3)%6 == 0) {
4 <body>
5 }
6 }
7 }
Fig. 9. An example of nested if statements in Pluto transformed code
Table 3 summarizes FPDetect ’s bug detection effectivness for the above two categories of bugs. The table only
lists detection percentages when the bitwise comparison with the non-buggy version flags an error-injected
version as being in error.
Table 3. Software bug detection results.
Loop bound Array access Loop bound Array access
#SL #RL %det #Sl #Rl %det #SL #RL %det #Sl #Rl %det
H1 374 374 100 300 267 99.67 H2 370 370 100 300 258 100
H3 374 374 100 300 267 98 H4 486 106 99.79 300 26 100
H5 486 106 100 300 26 100 H6 486 106 100 300 26 100
P1 10 10 100 18 17 100 P2 12 12 100 18 17 100
P3 12 12 100 18 17 100 P4 370 310 100 300 223 87.67
P5 370 310 96.22 300 223 82.67 P6 370 310 96.22 300 223 82.33
P7 414 104 98.55 300 48 97 P8 416 104 100 300 44 98.67
P9 416 104 98.56 300 44 98 W1 360 280 100 300 215 55.33
W2 360 280 44.72 11 6 54.67 W3 360 350 31.11 300 266 45.33
W4 260 280 45.28 300 215 60 W5 360 280 53.61 300 215 62.67
W6 360 350 100 300 266 100 C1 360 360 100 300 262 100
C2 360 360 100 300 262 100 C3 360 360 100 300 262 100
Loop ordering: Loop reordering was performed by hand. Figure 10 contains an example of loop reordering
where the first two loops are swapped. Changing the order of updates to A substantially changed the result of the
computation.
Unlike changes to array accesses and loop bounds, changing loop orders required non-local changes to the
Pluto-generated code. Therefore, we handcrafted the error injected versions. The handcrafted scenarios included
swapping nested loop pairs and re-ordering of non-nested loop blocks. The optimized codes included a maximum
of 360 nested for loops with a maximum loop nesting depth of 11. Testing all possible combinations of loop
reorderings will be prohibitively expensive. We limited our testing to 15 loop order bug injections per benchmark.
Figure 10 contains an example of loop reordering where the first two loops are swapped.
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1 for (t4=max(1,ceild(16∗t1+48∗t2+48∗t3,3));
2 t4<=min(min(min(min(floord(16∗t1+48∗t2+48∗t3+141,3),steps),64∗t2−1),64∗t3−1),16∗t1−16∗t2−16∗t3+9999);
3 t4++) {
4 for (t5=max(64*t2,-16*t1+16*t2-48*t3+3*t4-78);t5<=min(64*t2+63,-16*t1+16*t2-48*t3+3*t4);t5++) {
5 lbv=max(64∗t3,−16∗t1+16∗t2+16∗t3+3∗t4−t5−15);
6 ubv=min(64∗t3+63,−16∗t1+16∗t2+16∗t3+3∗t4−t5);
7 for (t6=lbv;t6<=ubv;t6++) {
8 A[( t4 − 1) % 2][ (−t4+t5)][ (−t4+t6)] = (((((0.5 ∗ A[ t4 % 2][ (−t4+t5)][ (−t4+t6)]) + ...
9 }
10 }
11 }
1 for (t5=max(64*t2,-16*t1+16*t2-48*t3+3*t4-78);t5<=min(64*t2+63,-16*t1+16*t2-48*t3+3*t4);t5++) {
2 for (t4=max(1,ceild(16∗t1+48∗t2+48∗t3,3));
3 t4<=min(min(min(min(floord(16∗t1+48∗t2+48∗t3+141,3),steps),64∗t2−1),64∗t3−1),16∗t1−16∗t2−16∗t3+9999);
4 t4++) {
5 lbv=max(64∗t3,−16∗t1+16∗t2+16∗t3+3∗t4−t5−15);
6 ubv=min(64∗t3+63,−16∗t1+16∗t2+16∗t3+3∗t4−t5);
7 for (t6=lbv;t6<=ubv;t6++) {
8 A[( t4 − 1) % 2][ (−t4+t5)][ (−t4+t6)] = (((((0.5 ∗ A[ t4 % 2][ (−t4+t5)][ (−t4+t6)]) + ...
9 }
10 }
11 }
Fig. 10. Source code before and after manual loop reordering
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